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Abstract
I present three essays in this thesis. The first essay provides novel empiri-
cal evidence on the evolution of the incentive cost of unemployment benefits
during an unemployment spell. Theoretical arguments have been proposed
for both inclining and declining benefit profiles. However, empirical evidence
on how the incentive cost of unemployment benefits may vary over the spell,
which is a key input in evaluating the time profile of benefits, is limited and
mixed. I estimate the incentive cost of benefits paid at various points during
an unemployment spell and find that the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to benefits and the incentive cost of UI are smaller for benefits
paid later in the spell. I argue that the decline in incentive costs is driven by
partially myopic job-search behaviour and non-stationarities in the dynamics
of job search. The second essay provides quasi-experimental evidence of the
short-term and long-term effects of fiscal stimulus programs in the UK hous-
ing and auto markets. In an influential work Mian and Sufi (2012) argue that
such temporary incentives are ineffective in boosting market activity in the
long-term. I show that a temporary tax cut in UK housing market has had
considerable long-term effects. I argue, using a dynamic search model with
frictions, that the magnitude of the long-term effect of a stimulus is directly
related to its duration. The third essay shows that frequent repayment can
act as a screening device in micro-lending under individual liability. A tight
repayment schedule can be used to screen out ”risky” borrowers. Borrowers
with more volatile profits would prefer contracts with higher interest rate but
more flexible repayment schedule, while ”safe” borrowers can afford to repay
more frequently. I show that frequent repayment can be used to design a menu
of contracts that achieves a separating equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Incentive Costs of
Unemployment Insurance: Evidence
From the UK
1.1 Introduction
The aim of unemployment insurance (UI) is to provide insurance against job
loss while maintaining the incentives for workers to search for a new job. As
these two forces act in opposing directions, the trade-off between them is the
key to the optimal design of UI policy. As time profile of UI benefits affects the
dynamics of household behaviour, including consumption and job search, the
design of optimal UI policy requires knowledge of the dynamics of incentive cost
and insurance value of UI over the unemployment spell. Although these are
ultimately empirical questions, we have almost no empirical evidence on how
these costs and benefits evolve over the unemployment spell. Consequently,
little is known about the optimal path of UI benefits. This is evident from
the considerable variation in the time profile of benefits across countries which
reflects the lack of consensus on whether benefits should increase or decrease
over time.
This paper provides novel evidence on how the incentive costs of UI change
over the unemployment spell, using unique quasi-experimental variation in the
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time profile of UI benefits in the UK. This variation is due to age-dependence of
UI benefits and provides exceptionally rich variation in benefit profiles across
cohorts. I exploit the fact that UI claimants receive a lower amount of weekly
benefits so long as they are under 25 and the level of benefits increases automat-
ically on the week in which the claimant turns 25. This creates a step-shaped
benefit profile, in which the location of the step will depend on the age of
claimant at the start of the spell. To estimate the effects of variation in bene-
fits at different unemployment durations, I compare the outcomes for different
cohorts who start their spells at different ages before 25 to those who start
just after turning 25 (who will face a flat benefit profile).
I exploit the flexible yet simple nature of this variation to estimate the
incentive cost of UI benefits paid at different unemployment durations and
provide a rich image of how these costs evolve over the spell.
Seminal papers in the theoretical UI literature have studied the optimal
time profile of benefits. However, the results from these studies are model-
dependent and cannot easily be connected to the data (Shavell and Weiss 1979;
Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; Werning 2002). Recently, a growing empirical
literature has employed the sufficient statistics approach to evaluate social
insurance policies based on high-level and easily estimable statistics. However,
this literature has focused almost exclusively on policies with a constant benefit
level and has been mostly silent about how the incentive cost and insurance
value of UI might change with the duration of unemployment.
One important exception is Kolsrud et al. (2018) who derive sufficient
statistics for characterizing the optimal time profile of benefits and imple-
ment their framework in the context of the Swedish UI system. Although this
provides the first, and to my knowledge, the only attempt at revealing the
dynamics of incentive costs of UI, Kolsrud et al. (2018) are constrained by the
nature of the variation they can use in Swedish UI policy. In particular, they
are only able to estimate the incentive cost associated with UI benefits paid
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in the first 20 weeks, and those paid thereafter. In contrast, the rich variation
in the UK benefit profile used in this paper lends itself to a much more flexi-
ble estimation strategy and yields a richer image of the evolution of incentive
costs.
In this paper, I estimate the incentive cost of UI benefits associated with
benefits paid at different parts of the unemployment spell. I use administrative
data from the UK and exploit the variation in UI benefit profiles created by
the dependence of UI benefit levels on the age of claimants. I first estimate
the elasticity of total duration of unemployment with respect to benefits paid
over different parts of the unemployment spell. These elasticities measure the
magnitude of the behavioural response to UI benefits paid at different points
of a spell. Similar to the standard Bailey-Chetty formula, the incentive cost
of benefits paid at time t of the unemployment spell is fully captured by the
corresponding fiscal externality, that is, the effect of increasing those benefits
on government budget. I calculate these incentive costs for benefits paid in each
part of the spell based on the corresponding estimates of duration elasticities.
To provide a more detailed account of how the incentive cost changes with
duration of unemployment, and to ensure robustness of the findings, I exploit
the flexibility of the policy variation and hypothetically divide the benefit
profile into periods of various lengths (e.g., 8-weeks, 12-weeks, 3 months, etc.)
and repeat the estimation for each configuration.
I find that the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits
paid at time t during the spell consistently falls with t, across all configurations.
In other words, UI benefits paid later in the spell induce a weaker behavioural
response. This, in turn, implies that the incentive cost associated with bene-
fits paid at longer durations is smaller than benefits paid earlier in the spell.
This has important implications for the optimal time profile of UI benefits.
Both theory and existing empirical evidence suggest that the insurance value
of UI increases with duration of unemployment, as agents run down their as-
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sets. The combination of decreasing incentive costs and increasing insurance
values would imply that increasing the tilt of the benefit profile, i.e. providing
relatively more generous long-term benefits, would increase welfare (Kolsrud
et al. 2018).
The declining pattern of incentive costs and the implied inclining bene-
fit profile is in contrast with the finding in the theoretical UI literature that
incentive costs rise over the spell and the UI policy must, therefore, be less
generous towards the long-term unemployed to incentivize job search (Shavell
and Weiss 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997). This theoretical result is de-
rived in a model with forward-looking agents and in a stationary environment.
To find the reason for the discrepancy between the theory and my results, I
empirically investigate both of these assumptions for job seekers in the UK.
I show that individuals fail to act in a forward-looking manner and do not
respond to changes in future benefits in advance. I also find that job find-
ing rates become less responsive to benefits at longer durations, which points
towards non-stationarities in the job-search environment. Incorporating such
non-stationarities in a dynamic job search model and assuming non-forward-
looking search1, indeed results in rising incentive costs (Kolsrud et al. 2018).
Therefore, these findings can help explain why, in spite of theory, incentive
costs fall over the unemployment spell.
This paper contributes to three literatures. First, the sufficient statis-
tics approach to design and evaluation of UI has focused almost exclusively
on overall costs and benefits of constant benefit profiles. I contribute to this
literature by revealing how the incentive cost of UI evolves over the unem-
ployment spell. Second, I contribute to the literature on the effects of UI on
labour supply (Rothstein 2011; Lalive, Van Ours, and Zweimu¨ller 2006; Lalive
2008) by providing estimates of the response of unemployment duration to
UI benefits at different durations. Finally, this paper contributes to the lit-
1Note that failure to respond to future benefits does not necessarily imply myopia, as it
is also consistent with lack of knowledge about the benefit schedule.
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erature on the effects of behavioural factors (such as inattention and present
bias) on individuals’ responses and how this may alter the design of optimal
policy (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009; Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013) by
providing evidence of myopic job-search.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 will briefly lay
out the conceptual framework for identifying incentive costs of UI. Section 1.3
describes the data and the institutional background of unemployment insur-
ance in the UK. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical strategy while section 1.5
presents the main results on duration elasticities and moral hazard costs. Sec-
tion 1.6 provides evidence of the mechanisms behind the findings. Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework: Moral Hazard
Cost of UI
This section briefly lays out the conceptual framework and derives the incentive
cost of UI. The derivation presented here closely follows Kolsrud et al. (2018).
The general insight developed by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) can
also be applied to the case of a dynamic UI policy. Suppose the UI policy
consists of n parts and consider the effect on social welfare of increasing the
benefit in part k, bk, by dbk. Such an increase affects social welfare through
three channels. First, there is the direct effect of benefits on the utility of
the unemployed which increases social welfare proportional to their marginal
utility of consumption. Second, the government needs to raise an additional
tax revenue of dbkDk, Dk being the expected time spent by the unemployed
in part k, to cover the mechanical cost of increasing benefits, in the absence
of any behavioural responses. However, individuals will respond to this more
generous benefit profile by staying unemployed for longer. This creates the
third effect which is the incentive cost of UI benefits. Due to this behavioural
response in unemployment durations, the government needs to raise the taxes
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further to finance the cost of paying UI benefits for longer2.
More specifically, as the argument above shows, the welfare cost of in-
creasing bk is captured by its effect on government’s budget. Let T denote the
lifetime of agents, Dk denote the expected time spent by the agent claiming
bk, and D =
∑n
k=1Dk denote the expected duration of total unemployment.
Given UI policy {b1, ...bn}, government’s budget can be written as:
G= (T −D)τ −D1b1−D2b2− . . .−Dnbn (1.1)
Denoting by Dl,bk the elasticity of expected duration in part l with respect
to benefits in part k, the welfare cost of increasing bk is therefore:
∂G
∂bk
=−Dk×
{
1 +
n∑
l=1
Dl(bl+ τ)
Dkbk
Dl,bk
}
≡−Dk×{1 +MHk}
(1.2)
This means that when increasing benefits bk by one unit, the required rise
in taxes is MHk times more than the implied mechanical cost. Equation (1.2)
shows that the mechanical cost, captured by the first term, is proportional to
the expected duration spent claiming bk. The moral hazard (incentive) cost
MHk depends on how the expected unemployment duration in each part of
the spell responds to the change in bk.
Although equation (1.2) suggests that to calculate MHk one would, in
principle, need to estimate Dl,bk for all combinations of l and k, starting from
a flat benefit profile (bk = b¯) the moral hazard cost of an increase in bk will
simplify to
2There is, in principle, a fourth effect as higher bk induces longer unemployment and
this can affect the utility of the unemployed. However, as Chetty (2006) shows, envelope
conditions of individuals’ optimization problem imply that this only has a second order effect
on their welfare as they have already optimized over benefits. More generally, job-seekers
may respond to changes in benefits along various margins. However, as long as they take
these variables into account in their optimization problem, the readjustments along these
margins in response to changes in benefits will only have a second order effect on their
welfare.
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MHk = D,bk ·
D
Dk
· b¯+ τ
b¯
(1.3)
which only depends on the elasticity of total duration of unemployment. Since
UI benefits are constant for the majority of claimants in the UK, I will use
Equation (1.3) in the empirical analysis. Equation (1.3) defines the disincen-
tive cost of increasing bk as the ratio of the behavioural cost (DD,bk) to the
mechanical cost (Dk), as proposed by Schmieder and Wachter (2017). Finally,
the ratio (b¯+ τ)/b¯ corrects this for the lost tax revenue from longer unemploy-
ment spells.
The evolution of moral hazard costs has important implications for the
design of optimal benefit profile. A decreasing sequence of moral hazard costs
would imply that it is less costly to increase long-term benefits than short-term
ones. Everything else equal, this would indicate that introducing an inclining
benefit profile that offers relatively more generous benefits to the long-term
unemployed, would improve welfare.
Kolsrud et al. (2018) show that in a stationary environment and with
forward-looking job-seekers, the moral hazard cost MHk is increasing in k.
However, as they also note, this result crucially depends on stationarity of the
environment as well as forward-looking job-search behaviour. Therefore, pres-
ence of non-stationarities, prevalent in many countries (Machin and Manning
1999) or deviations from forward-looking search due to behavioural factors
(e.g. present bias) can overturn this result. Therefore, how moral hazard costs
evolve over the spell is eventually an empirical question.
1.3 Institutional Background and Data
The unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom is known as Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA). There are two types of JSA: income-based and contribution-
based. I will focus on income-based claimants for reasons explained below3.
3Contribution-based JSA is not means-tested and is available to those who have paid
sufficient National Insurance contributions in the two years prior to job loss. The amount
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Income-based JSA is a means-tested benefit, available to claimants with a low
level of assets4 and can be claimed indefinitely, provided the claimants meet
the job-search requirements of the program.
The weekly amount of benefits does not depend on prior earnings and
is determined solely based on the personal circumstances of claimants. The
benefits are made up of two elements: a personal allowance plus certain pre-
miums (disability, dependent children etc.). I will focus on income-based JSA
claimants who only qualify for the personal allowance component.
The key variation I will use is due to the fact that the amount of bene-
fit (the personal allowance component) depends on the age of individuals. In
particular, claimants over 25 are paid at a higher rate than those under-255.
Notice that what determines the amount of benefit is not the age at the time
of making a JSA claim. Rather, the amount of benefit would increase auto-
matically if claimants turn 25 while on unemployment benefits. This creates
a step-shaped time profile for benefits and the exact location of this step de-
pends on how long before turning 25 a job-seeker starts her spell. This creates
rich variation in the time profile of benefits across cohorts of claimants which
I will exploit for my empirical strategy.
I use administrative data covering the universe of JSA claims in Great
Britain6 between January 2001 and April 2016. This dataset is an extract of
the National Benefits Database, held by the Department for Work and Pension.
The data includes information on start and end dates of claims, birthday of
the claimant, type of claim (contribution- or income-based), amount of benefit
paid, and reason for end of claim.
of contribution-based benefit is the same as that of income-based. Its duration however, is
limited to 182 days, unlike the income-based which can be claimed indefinitely.
4Less than £16,000 in savings.
5For example, the weekly benefits in 2015 for 18-24 and over-25 claimants were £57.90
and £73.10, respectively. The amount of benefit is updated every year. However, since JSA
benefits are closely indexed with inflation, the real rate of benefit almost stays constant over
the period of this study.
6This includes England, Wales and Scotland, but not Northern Ireland.
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New Deal for Young People. In order to assist young job seekers back
into employment, the UK government introduced the New Deal for Young
People (NDYP) in 1998 which was in place until 2011. To separate the effects
of this program from the effects of changes in benefits, for some of the empirical
results I will only use post-2011 spells. The rest of this section provides further
details on this.
Under NDYP, job seekers under 25 who had been unemployed for 6
months, and those older than 25 who had been unemployed for 18 months,
would receive job search assistance as well as training. This would affect in-
dividuals’ duration of unemployment. In particular, job seekers who started
a spell more than 6 months before turning 25 would have reached 6 months
of unemployment before turning 25 and would enter NDYP, while people who
started their spell less than 6 months before turning 25 would already be older
than 25 in 6 months and would not enter NDYP (unless they stayed unem-
ployed for 18 months). Because of this, for spells that start before 2011, I will
only be able to use the variation in benefit profiles within the first 6 months
of the spell, i.e. claimants who start their spell within 6 months of turning 25.
The reason is that claimants who start their spells more than 6 months before
turning 25 were treated differently and are not comparable to those starting
within 6 months of turning 25.
To make sure that NDYP does not confound the estimates, I will present
two sets of results for duration responses and moral hazard costs. First, I will
focus on the response to UI benefits in the short-term using spells that start
within 6 months of turning 25 from all years. The second set of results will
estimate the response to benefits for longer unemployment durations, but will
only use spells after 2011 to avoid the effects of NDYP.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
The incentive cost of UI depends crucially on how the duration of unemploy-
ment responds to changes in UI benefits. Therefore, as Equation 1.3 also
shows, D,bk is the key statistic we need to estimate to evaluate the moral
hazard cost of UI in part k of the spell. This section discusses the empirical
strategy for estimating D,bk as well as other components of MHk. Given that
the current benefit profile in the UK is flat (that is, for claimants aged 25
and above), the following empirical strategy is designed to estimate the dura-
tion responses and moral hazard costs around the current flat benefit profile.
This is to ensure that the resulting estimates reflect the costs of reforming the
existing flat benefit profile in the UK.
The variation in the time profile of UI benefits is due to the fact that
unemployed individuals under 25 are paid a lower rate of benefit than those
over 25. In particular, if a claimant turns 25 during an unemployment spell,
the benefits will automatically increase during the week in which she turns 25.
Panel A of Figure 1.1 shows the level of benefit as a function of age
around 25-th birthday. Consider the cohort of claimants who make a UI claim
k periods before turning 25. These are marked as cohort k in panel A of
Figure 1.1. Panel B shows the resulting step-shaped benefit profile that cohort
k face. Now consider job-seekers who start their spell immediately after turning
25 I will refer to these as cohort 0, as their spell starts 0 periods before 25.
Cohort 0 will face a flat benefit profile at the higher rate as shown by the blue
section in panel C. Panel D shows the flat benefit profile of cohort 0 along
with that of cohort k. The two cohorts will face different levels of UI benefits
for the first k periods, but same benefits thereafter. Denoting the benefits
paid during the first k periods by b¯k, this creates variation in b¯k which can be
used to estimate D,b¯k , the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect
to benefits in the first k periods. In particular, I will exploit this variation in
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regressions of the following form, on spells from cohorts 0 and k7:
ln(Di,t) = β0 + δk ln(b¯k,t) + θt+ui,t (1.4)
where Di,t is the duration of unemployment for spell i from year t, b¯k,t is the
benefits of the first k periods in year t and θt are year fixed effects.
The resulting δˆk coefficients provide estimates of D,b¯k , the elasticity of
duration with respect to all benefits up to period k. To recover the duration
elasticities with respect to bk only, notice that when evaluated at a flat benefit
profile
D,bk = D,b¯k − D,b¯k−1 (1.5)
which provides a simple method for recovering D,bk8.
Equation (1.4) yields consistent estimates if b¯k are exogenous with respect
to the error term, which requires the identifying assumption that, in the ab-
sence of the increase in benefits at 25, age at the start of spell would not be
correlated with duration of unemployment. Therefore, a possible threat to
identification is the case where age directly affects duration of unemployment.
If, for example, unemployment duration tends to increase with age regardless
of UI benefits, estimates of duration elasticities from equation (1.4) will be
biased upwards. This is because part of the difference in unemployment dura-
tions across cohorts would be driven by differences in age and not UI benefit.
To address this, I report a second set of estimates where I adjust the
observed durations for the effect of age as follows. I allow for age to be related
to duration of unemployment, but assume that, in the absence of the increase
in benefits at 25, expected duration would evolve smoothly with age at start
7To increase statistical power, I use a bandwidth of 4 weeks and include spells that start
within 2 weeks on either side of cohort k in that cohort. Cohort 0 in the regression consists
of spells starting up to 10 weeks after 25. Results are robust to changing these bandwidths.
8An alternative strategy would be to compare cohort k to cohort k− 1 and directly
estimate D,bk , as these cohorts face the same benefit profile in all time periods except for
period k. However, both of these cohorts are paid the lower rate for the first k−1 periods
and the higher rate after period k. Therefore the resulting estimate with respect to bk would
not correspond to variations around a flat benefit profile.
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of spell. Based on this identifying assumption, I estimate the counterfactual
relationship between age and expected duration by fitting a polynomial to the
average duration of unemployment excluding spells that start up to 3 years
before 25 as depicted in Figure 1.69. This counterfactual predicts how the
expected duration of unemployment would evolve with age if all cohorts faced
the same flat benefit profile at the higher (25+) rate. Therefore, the difference
between the predicted durations for cohort 0 and cohort k measures how much
of the observed difference in durations can be attributed to difference in age.
So, I subtract this from observed durations to remove the effect of age and
then use this corrected unemployment duration as the dependent variable in
a regression similar to equation (1.4) to estimate duration elasticities.
To estimate MHk, we also need estimates of expected duration of total
unemployment, D, and expected time spent in part k, Dk. Since the estimation
strategy is designed to provide estimates around a flat benefit profile, I estimate
D by the average duration for spells that start just after 25, and Dk by the
average time spent claiming bk. I use b+τb = 1.06 which corresponds to the
tax to benefit ratio that would balance government’s budget during the period
covered by the sample.
For empirical implementation, given the flexible nature of the available
policy variation, I examine different configurations by dividing the unemploy-
ment spell into periods of various lengths and report results for each configu-
ration to ensure the robustness of the results.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 1.2 provides graphical evidence on the response of unemployment dura-
tion to variation in UI benefits at different durations. The figure shows average
9A more conservative method would be to only use spells that start after 25 and estimate
a linear counterfactual. This yields similar results which I report in section 1.7.
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duration of unemployment, censored at 6 months10, in weekly bins of age at
the start of spell. It clearly illustrates some interesting points. First, average
unemployment duration is stable for spells starting sufficiently earlier than 25
(say, before 23) and those starting immediately after 25, and does not seem
to vary across cohorts. Also, as we approach the age of 25 and get closer to
higher benefits, the duration of unemployment increases steadily, as expected.
More importantly, the rate of increase in average unemployment duration
steadily rises as we approach 25, forming a convex trend. This curvature
of unemployment durations graph reveals an important point about how UI
benefits at different durations affect duration of unemployment. To see this,
consider two consecutive cohorts that start their spells n and n−1 weeks before
turning 25. These cohorts will face the same benefit profile except for week n,
during which cohort n− 1 have already turned 25 and receive benefit at the
higher (25+) rate while cohort n are still paid at the lower rate. The difference
in unemployment durations of these cohorts would reflect the effect of a change
in UI benefits during week n of the spell. The fact that durations rise faster
for cohorts closer to 25 implies that this effect is stronger for smaller values of
n. That is, unemployment durations respond more strongly to benefits paid
earlier in the spell.
Given the flexible nature of the variation in benefit profiles, I will report
estimates of duration responses and moral hazard costs that correspond to
periods of various lengths. In accordance with this, Figure 1.3 shows the
uncensored average duration of unemployment in 8 and 12 week steps. Each
point in these graphs corresponds to spells that start in the same week of age,
as before, but adjacent points are now 8 and 12 weeks apart in panels A and
B respectively.
Note that the large increase in average duration that happens 6 months
before 25, which was removed through censoring in Figure 1.2 is due to the
10Durations are censored at 6 months to remove the effect of the NDYP program on
durations. Uncensored durations exhibit similar patterns, as discussed below.
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NDYP program and is not related to the variation in benefit profile. This
will be accounted for in the empirical strategy, as discussed in section 1.4.
Disregarding this sharp rise, average unemployment duration exhibits the same
convex trend as individuals approach 25. Figure 1.3 also confirms that the
mean unemployment duration does not vary systematically with age for spells
starting after 25 or sufficiently earlier than 25. I will nevertheless, also report
estimates that adjust for the possible effect of age on durations.
1.5.2 Duration Responses and Moral Hazard Costs
Figure 1.4 and Table 1.1 present estimates of duration elasticities with re-
spect to benefits paid at different parts of the spell, both with and without
adjustment for the effect of age of unemployment duration. Panels A and
B of Figure 1.4 show duration responses to benefits paid within the first 6
months of the spell, for 8 and 12-week periods. These estimates reveal that
even in the short term, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect
to UI benefits consistently declines over the spell. For 8-week periods, the
elasticity of duration (before adjusting for age) with respect to benefits falls
from 0.387 (0.023) for the first period to 0.103 (0.027) in the second and 0.026
(0.025) for the third period. Elasticities with respect to 12-week periods also
fall from 0.433 (0.022) in the first period to 0.083 (0.026) in the second period,
confirming that duration responses are indeed smaller for later benefits.
While these results focus on the first six months of the spell, it would
also be interesting to see how the unemployment duration responds to changes
in benefits over longer time periods. Panel C of Figure 1.4 reports similar
estimates, comparing the effect of benefits in the first 6 months (26 weeks) to
those of the next 18 months, using spells that start after 2011. These estimates
once again show that unemployment duration is more responsive to UI benefits
in the first 6 months than all benefits paid over the next 18 months.
One interesting aspect of this finding is that it can help explain why exist-
ing estimates of duration elasticity with respect to potential benefit duration
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are typically somewhat smaller than elasticities with respect to benefit level
(Schmieder and Von Wachter 2016). This is consistent with the above results
because extension of potential benefit duration can be seen as an increase in
benefits paid in later parts of the spell, as opposed to an increase in overall
benefit level which changes benefits paid relatively earlier.
Based on these estimates of duration elasticities, we can calculate the
moral hazard costs associated with increasing benefits for any part of the spell
using equation (1.3). Table 1.1 and Figure 1.5 present estimates of moral haz-
ard costs that correspond to the three configurations considered previously.
Panels A and B of Figure 1.5 show the moral hazard cost of increasing benefits
in 8 and 12 week periods within the first 6 months of the spell. The implied
moral hazard cost falls over the spell across all configurations. It falls from
MH1 =1.24 (0.075) for increasing benefits paid in the first 8-weeks of spell
(not adjusted for age) to MH3 = 0.22 (0.216) for the third period (i.e. weeks
17 to 24). This means that in order to increase b1 by 1 percent, the govern-
ment would need to levy 1.24 times more resources from tax payers than the
implied mechanical cost, while increasing b3 would only require 0.22 more in
tax revenues than the mechanical cost of doing so.
As the results show, controlling for the effect of age yields slightly smaller
elasticity and moral hazard cost estimates, but does not change the results
qualitatively. Figure 1.6 shows that while duration of unemployment starts to
increase with age around the age of 26, there does not seem to be a relationship
between age and unemployment duration for spells starting up to a year after
25. To control for the effect of age, I exclude spells that start up to 3 years
before 25 and fit a polynomial to the observed average durations from the
remaining cohorts. This provides an estimated counterfactual which captures
the relationship between age and unemployment duration. I then use this
counterfactual to adjust observed spell lengths for the effect of age. Figure 1.6
shows this. Section 1.4 and Figure 1.6 provide further details.
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1.5.3 Implications for the Optimal Time Profile of Ben-
efits
The declining pattern in moral hazard costs has important implications for
the optimal time profile of benefits. In understanding these implications it is
important to keep one caveat in mind. Given that the identification strategy
used here is local and based on the response of young UI claimants to benefits,
it may be challenging to generalize the policy conclusions to older claimants.
However, it should be noted that a substantial portion of UI claims are made
by young claimants; Almost half of JSA claims in the sample are made by
claimants under the age of 30. So, even if one believes that the results are
only valid locally, they are still of significance as the age group studied con-
stitute a large fraction of the unemployed and claim a considerable portion of
government’s total UI budget.
The moral hazard costs, MHk, capture the loss in social welfare resulting
from increasing benefits in part k of spell. To evaluate the (local) optimality of
each bk one would also need an estimate of the consumption smoothing gains to
social welfare due to increasing bk. Nevertheless, when consumption smoothing
gains and moral hazard costs evolve in opposite directions, one can still draw
important policy recommendations about the overall time profile of benefits.
Since both theory and existing empirical evidence imply that consumption
smoothing gains of UI increase over the spell11 I assume that this is true in the
UK as well. This will allow me to determine how the current benefit profile
can be modified to increase social welfare.
In particular, consider a simple two part policy that pays benefits b1 in
the first part of spell and b2 thereafter. Let CSk denote the consumption
11Assuming job seekers are not liquidity-constrained and use their liquid assets to smooth
consumption during the unemployment spell, the marginal utility of consumption and the
value of UI benefits increases over time, as they deplete their assets. The only existing
empirical estimate of consumption drop during the spell that I know of is that of Kolsrud et
al. (2018) who take the consumption implementation approach (Gruber 1997) and estimate
how consumption changes over the spell. They find that the consumption smoothing gain
for benefits paid after the first 20 weeks is twice that of benefits paid in the first 20 weeks.
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smoothing gain of increasing bk. Kolsrud et al. (2018) show that whenever
CS2
MH2
> CS1MH1 an increase in b2 accompanied by a reduction in b1 improves
social welfare. In this case, because consumption smoothing gains increase
and the moral hazard costs decrease over the spell, this result implies that
introducing an inclining benefit profile would improve social welfare.
1.6 Why Does Moral Hazard Cost Decline?
Influential papers in the theoretical literature on dynamic UI have examined
the optimal time profile of UI benefits in stationary job-search models with
forward-looking agents (Shavell and Weiss 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997)
and have found that the moral hazard cost of UI increases over the spell and
therefore optimal UI benefits must be decreasing to provide the right incentives
for the unemployed to search for jobs. However, this result crucially depends
on the stationarity and forward-looking search assumptions which may not
necessarily hold in practice.
In this section I will examine both of these assumptions empirically and
show how deviations from these assumptions overturn this result and lead to
decreasing moral hazard costs in the present context. I first show that job
seekers do not fully respond to changes in future benefits and act in a seem-
ingly myopic manner. This eliminates the forward-looking mechanism behind
increasing moral hazard costs. I then present evidence of non-stationarities
in job search environment. The combination of non-forward-looking search
and non-stationary forces can explain why moral hazard costs of UI benefits
decrease over the spell.
To intuitively understand the role these assumptions play in the theo-
retical prediction about increasing moral hazard costs, consider the following
simplified version of the argument presented in Kolsrud et al. (2018). Consider
the effects of changes in bt and bt+1 on unemployment duration. The effect of
a change in bt+1 can be decomposed into two components. The first compo-
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nent is the effect of bt+1 on D1 and the second component is its effect on the
remaining duration after period 1, conditional on still being unemployed after
period 1. But notice that in a stationary environment, the effect of bt+1 on
the remaining duration (after period 1) is the same as the effect of bt on total
duration12. Therefore, the effect of bt+1 on unemployment duration exceeds
that of bt due to its first component.
Consider now what happens if these assumptions are violated. To the
extent that job-seekers exhibit myopia with respect to benefits, the first com-
ponent of the effect of bt+1 becomes smaller. In the extreme case of full myopia,
this component is zero and the moral hazard cost stays constant throughout
the spell. Furthermore, suppose unemployment dynamics are non-stationary
in the sense that probability of finding a job in later parts of spell becomes
less responsive to changes in benefits. In that case, the second component of
the effect of bt+1 will become smaller than the total effect of bt. With the first
component equal to zero due to myopia and the second one smaller than the
effect of bt due to non-stationarity, moral hazard cost now becomes decreasing
over the spell. Therefore, determining the gradient of moral hazard costs of
UI benefits is ultimately an empirical question.
1.6.1 Are Job Seekers Forward-Looking?
In this section I present evidence of lack of forward-looking job-search by show-
ing that job-seekers barely respond to changes in future benefits. Note that
the absence of response to future benefits does not necessarily imply myopic
behaviour, as it is also consistent with lack of knowledge about the benefit
path. I cannot distinguish between these two possibilities, but since I do find
some limited response to changes in benefits in the near future in some settings
(see Figure 1.9), lack of knowledge about benefit path does not seem to be a
plausible explanation. But it must be noted that if non-forward-looking is
12This is because the stationarity assumption implies that the effect of a change in bt+1
on the continuation value of a job-seeker in period 2, is the same as the effect of a change
in bt on the continuation value at the beginning of the spell.
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driven by ignorance about benefit path the welfare implications of the analysis
cannot be generalized to other contexts where agents are fully aware of the
benefit path.
To test the extent of forward-looking search among UK job-seekers, I
start by comparing the job finding rates early in the spell of cohorts who start
on the same level of benefit but face different benefit paths in the future.
Assuming job seekers are forward-looking, we expect the cohort with higher
future benefits to choose a relatively lower level of search effort early in the
spell, in anticipation of their higher future benefits.
More specifically, consider two cohorts who start their spells 12-weeks
and 24-weeks before turning 25 (the ”12-week” and the ”24-week” cohorts,
respectively). The benefits for these two cohorts are shown in panel A of
Figure 1.7. They receive the same benefits for the first 12 weeks but face
different benefit profiles after that. Since the 12-week cohort will receive higher
UI benefits in weeks 13-24, forward-looking search implies that their search
effort should be lower from the beginning compared to the 24-week cohort.
Panel B of Figure 1.7 shows the survival curves for the 12-week and the 24-week
cohorts. The vertical line marks week 23 of the spell, when the 12-week cohort
start receiving higher benefits. Even though these cohorts expect different
levels of benefits in the future, their job finding rates are indistinguishable for
the first 12-weeks. Interestingly, the two survival curves diverge immediately
after week 12, when the 12-week cohort start receiving higher benefits. In
other words, although job seekers react to higher current benefits by lowering
their search effort, this suggests that they fail to respond to changes in future
benefits.
To verify this, Figure 1.8 compares survival rates for cohorts that start
their spells 8, 16 and 24 weeks before 25. Vertical lines mark the weeks in
which the older cohort starts receiving higher benefits, namely weeks 8 and
16 in panels A and B respectively. Figure 1.8 confirms that the corresponding
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pairs of cohorts have nearly identical job finding rates as long as they receive
the same benefits and the older cohort lower their search effort only after they
receive the higher benefits. Therefore, the survival curves initially coincide but
start diverging once the benefit paths of the two cohorts diverge.
To provide more rigorous evidence of this seemingly myopic search be-
haviour, I estimate the effect of changes in benefits at different parts of the
spell on hazard rates out of unemployment. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 1.9. Each panel in this figure shows the effect of changing UI benefits in
an 8-week-long part of the spell on the probability of leaving unemployment
in 4 week periods13. The shaded area in each panel indicates the period for
which the UI benefit changes. The results in Figure 1.9 suggest that, for the
most part, hazard rates out of unemployment fail to respond to changes in
future benefits. More specifically, almost all hazard responses in weeks prior
to the rise in benefit (that is, to the left of shaded area in each graph) are
insignificant.
Additional evidence of this seemingly myopic search behaviour can be
found by examining the effect of future benefits on duration of unemployment
in the first part of the spell. Higher search effort early in the spell would
increase chances of finding a job early on and decrease D114. Therefore, we
would expect D1,bk > 0 not just for k = 1 but also for k > 1.
Table 1.2 presents estimates of D1,bk , elasticity of D1 with respect to
benefits in part k of spell, for the first 6 months of the spell and for 8 and
12-week periods15. The same strategy as described in section 1.4 is used to
estimate these elasticities, with D1 as the outcome variable instead of D. The
positive and significant estimates in row 1 indicate that higher current benefits
13Results for changes in benefits over 12-week-long periods are similar.
14It is straightforward to show that duration of unemployment in part k is simply the
sum of survival probabilities in each period within part k. That is, Dk =
∑Bk
t=Bk−1+1St,
with St =
∏t−1
j=1 (1−sj), where St is the probability of survival until time t, and st is the
search effort at time t.
15Once again, the estimation is restricted to the first six months to avoid the distortions
caused by NDYP.
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in the first part of spell indeed result in longer unemployment in that part.
However, the very small and insignificant estimates of rows 2 and 3 indicate
that, contrary to what we would expect from froward-looking agents, future
benefits do not seem to have an effect on D1.
The above evidence suggest that job seekers, to a large extent, fail to react
to changes in future benefits. Whether this is due to truly myopic behaviour
or reflects a lack of knowledge about benefit profile is difficult to determine in
this context. However, regardless of the underlying mechanism, the absence of
forward-looking response to future benefits eliminates the driving force behind
the increase in moral hazard costs over the unemployment spell.
1.6.2 Non-stationarity
The second important assumption that underpins the theoretical prediction
about rising moral hazard costs is that unemployment dynamics are stationary.
In particular, the effect of benefits on hazard rate out of unemployment is
assumed to be the same at all unemployment durations. In other words, the
short-term and the long-term unemployed are assumed to be equally responsive
to changes in their benefits. This may however not hold empirically if, for
instance, job opportunities tend to deteriorate with spell length.
A large empirical literature has documented and studied non-stationarities
in unemployment (Wolpin 1987; Blau and Robins 1986; Van den Berg 1990).
Non-stationarities can arise from heterogeneity among job seekers or could be
due to true duration dependence16.
It must be noted that the present characterization of moral hazard cost
is robust to the nature of non-stationarities. This is because, as discussed
in section 1.2, similar to the original Baily-Chetty model, the application of
16Heterogeneity in employability of job seekers would imply that more employable indi-
viduals exit unemployment faster and the composition of the pool of job seekers changes
over time, as the share of less employable individuals increases. This change in composition
lowers the overall job finding rate and results in declining exit rates from unemployment.
True duration dependence can arise when job opportunities become more scarce at longer
spell lengths, so that the job finding rate declines with unemployment duration.
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envelope conditions of agent’s optimization problem guarantees that the moral
hazard cost is fully captured by the behavioural revenue effect of benefits. In
particular, the moral hazard cost can be estimated based solely on the response
of unemployment durations to benefits and average durations, regardless of the
mechanism that drives the non-stationarities (heterogeneity or true duration
dependence).
Figure 1.10 shows the effect of changes in benefits over 12-week periods on
hazard rates out of unemployment, estimated for 4-week intervals. It clearly
shows that the effect of benefits on job finding hazards gets weaker at longer
spell lengths, meaning that job-seekers become less responsive to changes in
benefits later in the spell.
Another testable implication of stationarity is that, with a flat benefit
profile, exit rate from unemployment will be constant and will not depend
on the duration of unemployment. The reason is that under stationarity the
continuation value of the dynamic search problem will be independent of the
past unemployment duration.
Figure 1.11 shows exit rates from unemployment for job seekers who start
their spell immediately after turning 25. These individuals face a constant ben-
efit profile. Yet, as documented in other contexts, Figure 1.11 shows that exit
rate from unemployment in the UK decreases with duration of unemployment.
This indicates that non-stationary forces are indeed in action.
These two features of UK unemployment dynamics, i.e. seemingly myopic
search behaviour and the non-stationary unemployment environment, explain
why moral hazard cost of UI benefits decreases over the spell. The former
eliminates the force that would increase the moral hazard costs, as higher
future benefits affect search in prior time periods, while the latter reduces
later moral hazard costs even further as job seekers in later periods become
less responsive to changes in benefits. These forces are strong enough in the
present context to make moral hazard costs decrease over the unemployment
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spell.
1.7 Identification and Robustness Checks
Identification of elasticities in equation (1.4) relies on exogeneity of individuals’
cohort, i.e. age at the start of spell. One possible threat to identification,
the case where age might be directly correlated with unemployment duration,
was addressed in section 1.4 by explicitly accounting for the effect of age on
durations. This was done by estimating a counterfactual relationship between
age and duration using a flexible polynomial and spells that started before
22 or after 25. As a robustness check, Table 1.3 control for age in a more
conservative way, namely, by estimating a linear counterfactual using only
spells that start after 25, and reports duration elasticities and moral hazard
costs. The results confirm that estimates of duration responses and moral
hazard costs are robust to how the counterfactual is estimated.
Another potential source of endogeneity arises if 1) individuals are able
to influence when they start a spell17 (i.e. their cohort), and 2) doing so
is correlated with unemployment duration. For example, if more educated
under-25s who lose their jobs close to turning 25 chose to delay making a
claim until after turning 25, and if education was correlated with duration
of unemployment, then equation (1.4) would result in inconsistent elasticity
estimates.
This section addresses this latter concern. As shown below, there are dis-
tortions in the distribution of number of claims around birthdays. However, I
will argue that this cannot be driven by manipulation due to financial consid-
erations. Furthermore, I will show that these distortions, regardless of their
nature, do not affect unemployment durations. Therefore, individuals’ cohort
is indeed exogenous.
Figure 1.12 shows the number of UI claims in weekly bins. Vertical lines
17Note that workers who leave employment voluntarily do not qualify for UK Jobseekers
Allowance. Therefore, it is not possible to time the start of spell by choosing when to quit.
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mark the week of claimants’ birthday. Number of claims drops sharply just
before each birthday and rises above its long run trend immediately afterwards.
At first, this may seem to suggest that those close to a birthday tend to delay
claiming UI until after their birthday, presumably to receive the higher weekly
benefits. However, this cannot be the case for at least two reasons. First, the
fact that similar distortions happen around all birthdays indicates that the
observed pattern at 25 cannot be explained by financial incentives, as there
is no change in financial incentives (minimum wages, benefits, etc.) at other
ages. Second, even at the age of 25, job-seekers have no incentive to delay
their UI claim as income-based JSA can be claimed indefinitely and regardless
of age. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for the distortion around 25 to be the
result of individuals’ choice. So, which cohort one ends up in is not correlated
with individual characteristics18.
Nevertheless, one might still be concerned that this ”birthday effect”,
regardless of its nature, might bias the estimates of the duration elasticities
and moral hazard costs. To rule this out, I examine the average duration
of unemployment around other birthdays for up to 3 years either side of 25
in Figure 1.13. Unemployment duration evolves smoothly around all other
birthdays and shows no sign of being affected by this ”birthday effect”. I also
run placebo regressions at birthdays other than 25 and test for the presence of
a birthday effect. Table 1.4 presents the results of these placebo regressions.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper has presented novel evidence of the evolution of behavioural costs
of unemployment insurance over the unemployment spell. The moral hazard
costs, as measured here, are sufficient statistics for local welfare analysis and
fully capture the welfare costs of providing more generous benefits at each
point during the unemployment spell. The results clearly indicate that the
18Unfortunately, I have been unable to find a plausible explanation for the distortions in
the distribution of claims. However, as this section shows, regardless of its underlying cause,
this does not pose a threat to the identifying strategy implemented in this paper.
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welfare cost of increasing UI benefits declines over the unemployment spell
and providing more generous benefits becomes relatively less costly later in
the spell. Given that existing evidence shows consumption smoothing gains
of UI increase over the spell, my findings imply that introducing step-wise
increases to the current benefit profile will improve welfare.
In order to explain why moral hazard costs of UI decline in the UK, in
spite of the theoretical prediction to the contrary, I empirically examined the
two main forces that influence the evolution of these costs over the spell. I
found evidence of seemingly myopic search behaviour and non-stationarities
in unemployment dynamics. These deviations from the assumptions of the
theoretical job search models explain the discrepancy between theory and my
empirical findings.
33
1.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Variation in Time Profile of UI Benefits
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Notes: The figure shows the variation in time profile of UI benefits. Panel A shows the benefit
level around 25 years of age and marks cohort k as individuals who start a spell k periods before
turning 25. Panel B shows the benefit profile for cohort k. Panel C shows the benefit profile
(the blue segment) for cohort 0 who start their spell immediately after turning 25. Panel D
shows how comparing the benefit profile of the two cohorts creates variation in benefits of the
first k periods.
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Figure 1.2: Average Censored Durations of Unemployment
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Notes: The figure shows the duration of unemployment censored at 6 months. The censoring is
done to avoid the effect of the New Deal for Young People program (see section 1.3). The figure
shows that duration of unemployment is stable immediately after 25 and for spells starting
sufficiently earlier than 25. However, as claimants approach 25, the duration of unemployment
steadily increases. Moreover, since UI benefit rises at 25, the curvature of this increase indicates
that unemployment duration responds more strongly to changes in benefits paid earlier rather
than later in the spell.
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Figure 1.3: Average Duration of Unemployment
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Notes: The figure shows the average duration of unemployment as a function of age
for spells that start every 8 weeks and 12 week in panels A and B respectively. Unem-
ployment duration is stable immediately after 25 and sufficiently earlier than 25. But it
rises steadily as individuals approach 25. Moreover, since UI benefit rises at 25, the cur-
vature of this increase indicates that unemployment duration responds more strongly to
changes in benefits paid earlier rather than later in the spell. The sharp rise in durations
between 25 and 25 is due to the New Deal for Young People program (see section 1.3)
and is accounted for in the estimation.
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Figure 1.4: Elasticity of Duration w.r.t Benefits Paid at Different Spell Lengths.
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Figure 1.4: Elasticity of Duration w.r.t Benefits Paid at Different Spell Lengths
(continued)
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Notes: The figure shows estimates of elasticity of total unemployment duration
w.r.t benefits paid at different parts of spell. Panel A and B report elasticities w.r.t
8-week and 12-week periods during the first 6 months, using spells from 2000-2015.
The estimation is restricted to the first 6 months to avoid the effects of NDYP (see
section 1.3). Panel C uses spells starting after 2011, when NDYP is no longer in
effect, and reports elasticities w.r.t benefits paid in the first 6 months (26 weeks)
and the next 18 months. Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping using 1000
replications.
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Figure 1.5: Moral Hazard Cost of UI Benefits Paid at Different Spell Lengths
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Figure 1.5: Moral Hazard Cost of UI Benefits Paid at Different Spell Lengths
(continued)
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Notes: The figure shows moral hazard cost of increasing benefits for different parts
of spell. Panels A and B show the moral hazard cost for 8-week and 12-week long
periods for the first 6 months, using spells from 2000-2015. The estimation is re-
stricted to the first 6 months to avoid the effects of NDYP (see section 1.3). Panel C
uses spells starting after 2011, when NDYP is no longer in effect, and reports moral
hazard cost of increasing benefits for the first 6 months and for the next 18 months.
Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping using 1000 replications.
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Figure 1.6: Controlling for the Effect of Age on Unemployment Duration
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Notes: The solid red line shows the predicted relationship between age and unem-
ployment duration if all individuals faced a flat benefit profile at the higher (25+)
rate. To control for the possible direct effect of age on unemployment duration, I
estimate the counterfactual relationship between age and duration in the absence of
variation in benefits and adjust durations accordingly (see section 1.4). To estimate
this counterfactual, I exclude spells starting up to 3 years before 25 and fit a flexible
polynomial to the remaining observed durations:
Di =
q∑
j=0
βj · (wi)j +α · I {agei < 22}+ui
where α captures the difference in durations between younger (under 22) and older
(25+) claimants due to the NDYP program (see section 1.3) as well as the effect of
facing different (constant) benefit levels.
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Figure 1.7: Survival Curves for Cohorts Starting Spells 12 and 24 Weeks Before 25
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Notes: Panel A shows the UI benefit profile for two cohorts who start a spell 12-weeks
and 24-weeks before turning 25. The survival curves in panel B show the fraction of job
seekers still unemployed over time. With forward-looking job-seekers, we would expect
the job finding rate of the 12-week cohort, who anticipate higher benefits in weeks 13 to
24, to be lower from the beginning of the spell. However, as panel B shows, the survival
curves of the two cohorts are indistinguishable right up to week 12, when the 12-week
cohort actually start receiving the higher benefits. It is only then that the job finding
rates fall and the two survival curves diverge. This indicates that job-seekers do not
react in advance to changes in future benefits.
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Figure 1.8: Survival Curves for Cohorts Starting Spells 8, 16 and 24 Weeks Before
Turning 25
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Notes: The figure shows fraction of job seekers still unemployed as a function of unem-
ployment duration. Panel A compares the survival rates of the cohorts who start their
spell 8 and 16 weeks before turning 25 while panel B does the same for cohorts starting
16 and 24 weeks before 25. In both cases, the job finding rates are indistinguishable
while the two cohorts receive the same amount of benefits. However, once the older
cohort (solid blue) reach 25 and actually receive the higher benefit, their job finding
rate decreases. This shows that search behaviour is not responsive to changes in future
benefits and is mostly driven by current benefits.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of change in current and future benefits on hazards out of unem-
ployment.
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Notes: The figure shows the effect of a change in benefits paid in 8-week-long periods on
exit rates from unemployment. The shaded interval in each panel marks the interval in
which the corresponding benefits are changing. It clearly shows that exit rates respond
to changes in contemporaneous benefits, but not to changes in future benefits, as nearly
all estimates prior to the shaded intervals are insignificant. The effect of benefits in part
k of spell, bk, on job finding rates at time t, is estimated using proportional hazards
models of the following form for individuals in cohorts k and k−1:
log hi,t = αt+βk,t log bk,i
where hi,t is the exit hazard for individual i at time t and bk is the level of benefit for
individual i in part k of spell.
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Figure 1.10: Effect of changes in current benefits on exit rates from unemployment.
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Weeks since start of spell
Eff
ec
t o
f c
urr
en
t b
en
efi
t o
n h
az
ard
 ra
tes
Notes: The figure shows the effect on the hazard of leaving unemployment over
4-week intervals of an increase in contemporaneous UI benefits paid over 12-week
periods. That is, the three estimates on the left correspond to the effect of increasing
benefits of the first 12 weeks and the three estimates on the right show the effect of
increasing the benefits of weeks 12 to 24. Although benefits have a significant effect
on probability of leaving unemployment early in the spell, the magnitude of this
effect gradually declines towards zero. This indicates that unemployment dynamics
are non-stationary and job finding rates become less responsive to benefits at longer
durations.
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Figure 1.11: Exit Rate From Unemployment
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Notes: The figure shows exit rate from unemployment as a function of duration of
unemployment for spells that start just after turning 25. In a stationary environ-
ment, we would expect the exit rates to be constant and independent of unemploy-
ment duration, as job seekers face a flat benefit profile after 25. However, the exit
rate decreases steadily as unemployment durations increases, indicating that non-
stationary forces (heterogeneity or true duration dependence) affect the probability
of finding a job.
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Figure 1.12: Number of UI Claims in Weekly Bins of Age
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Notes: The figure shows the number of UI claims in weekly bins of age. The vertical
line marks the week of 25-th birthday. Although there is a distortion in the distri-
bution of claims around 25, the same distortions happen around all other birthdays.
Given that there is no change in financial incentives (e.g. housing benefit, mini-
mum wage, etc.), the distortions around 25 cannot be driven by financial incentives.
section 1.7 shows that regardless of its nature, this distortion does not undermine
identification of duration responses to benefits.
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Figure 1.13: Duration of Unemployment Around Birthdays Other Than 25
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Notes: The figure shows the average duration of unemployment in weekly bins around birthdays other than 25. Vertical lines mark the week of the
corresponding birthday. The average duration evolves smoothly around all birthdays and shows no sign of a ”birthday effect”. This supports the identifying
assumption that duration of unemployment is not affected by distortions in the distribution of claims around birthdays.
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Table 1.1: Duration Elasticities and Moral Hazard Costs
(A) (B) (C)
8-week periods 12-week periods 6 vs. 18 months
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
D,b1 0.387*** 0.258*** 0.433*** 0.275*** 0.632*** 0.440***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.037) (0.030)
D,b2 0.103*** 0.043* 0.083*** 0.001 0.067 -0.016
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.041) (0.034)
D,b3 0.026 -0.025
(0.025) (0.021)
MH1 1.241*** 0.827*** 1.040*** 0.661*** 0.957*** 0.667***
(0.075) (0.064) (0.053) (0.046) (0.057) (0.045)
MH2 0.555*** 0.231* 0.419*** 0.005 0.258 -0.063
(0.145) (0.128) (0.130) (0.113) (0.159) (0.133)
MH3 0.221 -0.211
(0.216) (0.180)
Adjusted for age No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The first 3 rows of the table report estimates of elasticities of unemployment duration
from equation (1.4). Elasticities with respect to benefits paid over 8-week and 12-week periods
during the first 6 months of the spell are reported in panels (A) and (B). Panel (C) divides
the first two years of the spell into a 6 month and an 18 month periods. Rows 4-6 report
the corresponding moral hazard costs. Moral hazard costs and duration elasticities decrease
over the spell across all specifications. Column (2) of each panel also controls for the effect of
age on duration of unemployment. Standard errors are computed by boostrapping using 1000
replications.
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Table 1.2: Duration Elasticities With Respect to Current and Future Benefits
8-week 12-week
periods periods
D1,b1 0.194*** 0.262***
(0.013) (0.016)
D1,b2 0.005 -0.014
(0.015) (0.017)
D1,b3 -0.026
(0.015)
Notes: The table reports estimates of elasticity of D1, duration of unemployment
in the first period, with respect to benefits paid over current and future periods,
for the first 6 months of spell. Although the contemporaneous elasticities on the
first row are significant, those with respect to future benefits on rows 2 and 3 are
all very small and statistically insignificant. These estimates show that, contrary to
what we would expect from forward-looking job search, the time spent unemployed
in the first period is not responsive to changes in future benefits. Standard errors
are computed by boostrapping using 1000 replications.
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Table 1.3: Robustness to the Method of Estimating the Counterfactual
(A) (B) (C)
8-week periods 12-week periods 6 vs. 18 months
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
D,b1 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.291*** 0.275*** 0.432*** 0.440***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030)
D,b2 0.058*** 0.043* 0.025 0.001 -0.226*** -0.016
(0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.035) (0.034)
D,b3 -0.006 -0.025
(0.021) (0.021)
MH1 0.848*** 0.827*** 0.699*** 0.661*** 0.654*** 0.667***
(0.058) (0.064) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045)
MH2 0.314*** 0.231* 0.128 0.005 -0.875*** -0.063
(0.118) (0.128) (0.097) (0.113) (0.135) (0.133)
MH3 -0.055 -0.211
(0.177) (0.180)
Method Linear Polynom. Linear Polynom. Linear Polynom.
Notes: The table shows that the falling pattern in duration elasticities and moral hazard costs is
robust to how the counterfactual is estimated. It reports estimation results similar to Table 1.1.
To check the robustness of the estimates to the method of controlling for the effect of age,
column (1) of each panel controls for age by estimating a linear counterfactual, based only on
spells that start after 25. Column (2) repeats the results from Table 1.1 where the counterfactual
is estimated using a flexible third degree polynomial based on spells that start before 22 and
after 25. As the table shows the results in the two columns of each panel are very close. More
importantly, the general result that duration elasticities and moral hazard costs decline over the
spell is preserved.
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Table 1.4: Placebo Elasticities Estimated Around Birthdays Other Than 25
Age 26 Age 27 Age 28 Age 29
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
D,b1 0.017 0.004 -0.018 -0.036 -0.029 -0.051** -0.017 -0.018
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
D,b2 -0.024 0.007 -0.023 -0.055* 0.015 -0.020 0.023 0.043
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
D,b3 0.018 -0.050* -0.078** 0.020
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032)
Notes: The table reports placebo estimates of duration elasticities around birthdays other than
25. The placebos elasticities are estimated in the same way as those around 25, using equation
(1.4) and controlling for age using a third degree polynomial. Most estimates are insignificant.
The few estimates that are statistically significant are very small and all have the wrong sign.
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Chapter 2
Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence
From the UK
2.1 Introduction
During the Great Recession many governments around the world introduced
fiscal stimulus packages to encourage economic activity in various markets,
most notably the housing and the auto markets. These were usually in the from
of a temporary subsidy or tax cut. Despite the consensus on the short-term
effectiveness of such stimulus schemes, there is little agreement on whether
they can have a longer lasting impact on the economy.
The short-term boost in market activity, during the period that the stim-
ulus is in place, constitutes two different types of response. First, an extensive
margin response by consumers who would not have entered the market oth-
erwise, but do so due to the incentives offered by the scheme. This is what
I will refer to as the the long-term or the permanent impact of the stimulus,
as this effect will not be reversed afterwards. Second, a timing response by
consumers who merely shift their purchases forward in time to take advantage
of temporary incentives offered by the scheme. Since these purchases would
have otherwise happened in the near future and shortly after the end of the
program, the re-timing response creates a drop in the volume of transactions
once the stimulus scheme is over. This reversal drives a wedge between the
size of the short-term and the long-term effects of such temporary incentive
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schemes.
In this paper, I will first present estimates of the short-term and long-term
effects of a tax cut in the UK housing market and show that a substantial part
of the response to this tax cut has been through the extensive margin and it
has therefore had a sizeable permanent effect. I will then argue that, in the
presence of frictions in the market, the share of extensive margin response out
of total short-term response is directly related to the duration of the incentive
scheme. If the stimulus runs for a short period of time, most of the response
will be driven by re-timing and will be reversed shortly after the program
ends. This implies that a short-lived temporary incentive will not succeed in
creating a considerable permanent effect, while a longer stimulus is likely to
have a relatively larger permanent impact.
This paper is related to the body of work that provides evidence on the
extent to which short-term timing response to taxes may exceed long-term
responses (Auerbach and Poterba 1988; Burman and Randolph 1994; Goolsbee
2000) as well as the more recent literature on estimating the effects of fiscal
stimulus using micro data, including Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006),
Agarwal, Chunlin, and Souleles (2007) and Parker et al. (2013) who examine
the effect of tax rebates on consumption of non-durables and find strong short-
term effects but no evidence of reversal afterwards.
More closely related to this paper are Mian and Sufi (2012) and Best and
Kleven (2017). Mian and Sufi (2012) find that the short-term effect of the 2009
CARS1 program in the US was almost entirely driven by re-timing responses
and was almost completely reversed due to lower market activity in subsequent
months. They conclude that ”although the initial effect of CARS on auto
purchases is large, there is strong evidence of swift program reversal”, and
that almost all of purchases under the CARS program would have otherwise
occurred within 10 months after it ended. On the other hand, Best and Kleven
(2017) study the UK Stamp Duty holiday of 2009, a temporary transactions
tax cut in the UK housing market, and find that nearly 70% of the short-
term response was along the extensive margin and only 30% of it was reversed
1Cars Allowance Rebate System (CARS) program, commonly referred to as Cash for
Clunkers.
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during the year following the tax holiday.
In this paper I will try to take a first step towards reconciling these two
seemingly contradictory results by arguing that, in markets with frictions, the
share of extensive margin out of total short-term response, is linked to the
duration of the program2. I begin by presenting estimates of the short-term
and long-term effects of a temporary tax cut in the UK housing market showing
that this temporary incentive has had a sizeable effect on market activity not
just in the short term (i.e. during the stimulus) but also in the long-term.
The second part of the paper will illustrate the link between the duration of a
stimulus and its permanent impact using a simple search model of the housing
market.
Section 2.2 will explain the context of the UK Stamp Duty reform of
2015 and estimate its short-term and long-term effects on market activity.
Section 2.3 will present the model to illustrate the effect of program duration
on its long-term impact. Section 2.5 Concludes.
2.2 The Effects of UK Stamp Duty Reform
2.2.1 Context and Data
Property transactions in the UK are liable to a transaction tax known as
the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT). Until April 2015, SDLT was applicable to
transactions in all of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland).
However, Scotland Act 2012 provided the Scottish Parliament with the power
to introduce devolved taxes. As a result The Scottish Government announced
in October 2014 that starting from April 2015 a new tax called Land and
Buildings Transaction Tax (LBTT) will replace SDLT in Scotland.
In the meantime, on 4th December 2014, four months before LBTT was
due to come into effect, the UK government announced an unanticipated re-
form to SDLT with immediate effect. This reform ”undercut” Scotland’s LBTT
rates for a wide range of house prices. Notice that this unanticipated reform
would apply to all of the UK, including Scotland where SDLT would remain
2I will assume throughout that the start of the stimulus program is unanticipated but
its end date is anticipated, as was the case in UK Stamp Duty holiday, CARS in the US
and the reforms that I study in this paper.
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applicable for four months until April 2015. This meant that the Scottish hous-
ing market would experience two tax reforms in a short space of time: First,
the unanticipated reform of the UK-wide SDLT in December 2014, followed
by the pre-announced implementation of Scottish LBTT in April 2015.
Table 2.1 shows tax rates under old SDLT, new SDLT and LBTT. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows total tax liability under each tax regime. The three schedules
are numbered in the chronological order of their applicability in Scotland. The
combination of these reforms creates interesting variation in tax liability in
Scotland over time, which I will exploit for the empirical analysis that follows.
I combine data from two sources. For the pre-LBTT period (i.e. before
April 2015), I use administrative data on tax returns provided by HMRC cover-
ing all property transactions in the UK. This dataset contains rich information
on tax return for each transaction, but has very little information otherwise.
For the post-LBTT period, I use total number of monthly transactions in
£5000 bins provided by Revenue Scotland.
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
I employ a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the short-term effect as
well as the extent of reversal after the end of tax cut. I use the transactions in
[£335K, £480K] as the treated group. Figure 2.1 shows that the transactions
in this group are taxed less under the new SDLT. This means that these
properties received a tax cut in December 2014 when SDLT was unexpectedly
reformed. However, the same price range would be liable to a higher level of
tax under Scotland’s LBTT which was due in April. Therefore, in the [£335K,
£480K] price bracket, the combination of these two reforms proxy a temporary
and unanticipated tax cut. It should be noted that the upper bound of this
bracket was chosen such that it would be sufficiently away from the £500K
notch in the old SDLT schedule. Best and Kleven (2017) document that these
notches induce considerable bunching. The SDLT reform removes the notch
at £500K. This would reduce the number of transactions just below £500K as
the extra mass around the notch gradually disappears. The treated price range
is chosen such that it does not include the bunching region around £500K.
It is worth noting that not all properties in the treated price range receive
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the same treatment. Properties in the lower parts of the treated price bracket
receive a relatively larger cut followed by a smaller increase in tax rates than
the ones with higher prices. I use this rather wide treatment range to improve
statistical power. However, this affects the interpretation of the estimates. One
could think of the estimated response as the response to the average changes
in tax rates. Furthermore, the main purpose of the empirical exercise here is
to show that the long-term response to such changes in tax rates is not zero
rather than providing precise estimates of the magnitude of the response.
As the counterfactual, one would ideally use a group of transactions that
are unaffected by these tax reforms and the transactions below £125K indeed
provide this opportunity. But the market for properties under £125K is un-
likely to be sufficiently similar to that of much more expensive properties in
the treated range3.
The closest alternative is to use the transactions towards the top end of
the first tax bracket. Although the reforms affect tax liability in this bracket
but the magnitude of the changes are relatively small, especially for properties
close to £250K. I use the [£200K, £230K] price range as the control group.
Once again, this is chosen to exclude the bunching region close to the £250K
Notch. The results are not sensitive to the exact width of this range.
To estimate the short-term effect and the reversal, I implement a
difference-in-differences strategy using the following regression:
nit = α0Pret+α1Cutt+α2Revt+α3Postt+α4Treati
+βsCutt×Treati+βrRevt×Treati+βpPostt×Treati+uit (2.1)
where nit is the log number of transactions for group i (treated and control)
at time t, while Pret, Cutt, Revt and Postt are dummies for pre-reform, tax
cut, reversal and post-reversal periods respectively. βs and βr will capture the
short-term effect and the reversal respectively, while βp will indicate whether
the two series completely converge after the reversal period, implying that the
reversal period is over. The duration of the reversal period is visually chosen
3Indeed, a closer look at the data shows that the two groups had been following different
trends before the reform.
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to be two months. However, the results are not sensitive to this choice.
2.2.3 Results
Figure 2.2 shows the normalised number of transactions in treated and control
price brackets between April 2010 and Feb 2016. Each series is rescaled by its
own mean. The two vertical dashed lines show the time period of interest. The
first line marks December 2014 when the tax was cut because of the new SDLT
rates introduced by the UK government. The second line indicates April 2015,
when the higher Scottish LBTT rates were anticipated to come into effect.
First, Figure 2.2 shows that during the four preceding years the control
series closely follows the treated series. The notable exception to this appears
to happen in July and August 2014. The volatility in these two months might
have been due to the uncertainty in the run up to the Scottish independence
referendum, which took place in mid-September. Notice in particular that the
control and the treated series remain parallel in the post-reform period. This
alleviates the concern that the control group is receiving a small tax cut and
the potential bias that this can introduce.
To see the response more clearly, Figure 2.3 plots the two series after
January 2014. Bunching around the time notch and the missing transactions
after the notch are clearly visible in this graph. Also, to make the comparison
with the prediction of the model of the next section easier, Figure 2.4 plots the
difference in activity between the treated price bracket and the counter-factual.
Figure 2.4 shows that in the months before the first reform, the difference
between the two series is relatively stable around zero, except for the volatility
before the Scottish independence referendum. After the unanticipated tax cut,
there is a small increase in activity in the first two months. As we get closer to
the end of the tax cut the volume of transactions increases rapidly and peaks
in March, the last month before the end of the tax cut. However, the fact
that the difference becomes negative and large for the months immediately
after March, suggests that a considerable number of transactions were pulled
forward in response to the tax cut. This subsequent drop in activity reverses
the short-term effect of the tax cut.
Table 2.2 reports the results for Equation 2.1. The short-term effect cap-
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tured by βs shows that during the tax cut monthly activity has been, on
average, 47 to 50 percent higher compared to what it would otherwise be.
This accumulates over four months from December to March. However, the
large and negative βr shows that subsequent monthly activity has been 50 to
54 percent lower than what it would have been had there not been a tax cut.
This will, to some extent, reverse the short-term effect over the two-month re-
versal period. The bottom row of the table calculates the share of permanent
effect out of the total short-term response, as 1 - 2|βr|4βs . These estimates imply
that up to 60 percent of the increase in the number of transactions during the
tax cut can be attributed to extensive margin response, and will therefore be
a permanent effect.
The next section will present a simple search model to highlight the link
between the duration of a temporary stimulus and the magnitude of its per-
manent effect.
2.3 Model
This section presents a search model of the housing market. The aim of this
simple model is to highlight the idea that the share of the permanent effect
of a temporary stimulus in its total short-term effect is directly related to its
duration.
The intuition behind the model is as follows. In deciding whether to enter
the market during the tax cut, individuals consider how long it is left until
the stimulus period is over. When entering the market at later stages (i.e.
closer to the end of stimulus) individuals are less likely to find a match before
the end. Therefore, the closer we get to the end the fewer people will find it
worthwhile to start searching. This means that the extensive margin response
(i.e. number of new entries) will fall towards the end of the stimulus. A short-
lived stimulus program will not provide enough time for individuals to find a
match and will be less successful in persuading people to enter the market. In
contrast a longer stimulus program will provide more time for searching and
will on average induce a larger number of people to enter the market. This
will in turn increase the permanent effect of the program.
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2.3.1 Setup
Every period a new cohort of individuals are born and decide whether to enter
the market and search for a match or take no action. Let F (.) denote the
cumulative distribution of the present discounted value of inaction for each
cohort and Vt the value of entering the market in period t. Therefore, the
fraction F (Vt) of cohort t will enter the market as the value of doing so is
larger than the value of taking no action for them. To simplify the analysis,
I will assume that once individuals enter, they will not be able to dropout of
the market and have to search until a match is found.
Individuals who have entered the market, choose their search effort st
every period, which is normalised to equal the probability of finding a match.
Cost of effort is given by the cost function c(s), with c′(s), c′′(s) > 0. Let
H denote the present discounted value of the stream of utilities from finding
a match. The price of the commodity exclusive of tax, P is assumed to be
constant. Let B(τ) =H−P (1+ τ) denote the value of a match given tax rate
τ .
The model abstracts from the supply side by assuming that pre-tax prices
are fixed. This may not be a precise description of some markets, including
the housing market where the supply is rather inelastic, especially in the short
run. However, this assumption simplifies the model considerably and a similar
one-sided model of the supply side can be shown to lead to similar results.
The number of people searching at time t, denoted by At, evolves accord-
ing to At = At−1(1− st−1) +F (Vt). The number of matches formed in the
market in period t is given by Nt = Atst. Combining the two yields:
Nt = (At−1(1− st−1) +F (Vt))st (2.2)
This demonstrates that to characterize the dynamics of the number of
transactions we need to understand the paths of Vt, the value of entering the
market and st, agents’ search effort. This will then shed light on how the
duration of the tax cut affects the share of extensive margin response out of
the total short-term response.
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2.3.2 Extensive Margin Response
Consider an unanticipated and temporary tax cut which reduces the tax rate
from τ¯ to τ . The tax cut starts at t= 0 and ends at t= T at which point the
tax rate resumes to τ¯ . The end of the tax cut is announced in advance and is
known to individuals.
The value of searching at time t is given by:
Vt = maxst {stB(τt) + θ(1− st)Vt+1− c(st)} (2.3)
where θ is agents’ discount factor.
When the tax rate is not expected to change individuals face the same
continuation value every period and Vt = Vt+1 ≡ V (τ¯). This implies that in
the steady state with τ = τ¯ , the same fraction, F (V (τ¯)) of every new cohort
enter the market and start to search. This is true before the start of the tax
cut at t= 0 and also for t≥ T when the tax cut is over. During the temporary
tax cut
Vt = maxst {stB(τ) + θ(1− st)Vt+1− c(st)}, 0≤ t < T. (2.4)
Notice that Vt 6= Vt+1 during the tax cut as agents expect the tax rate
to change in the future. To characterize the dynamics of Vt, let h(x) ≡
maxs {sB(τ)+θ(1−s)x− c(s)} be the function that relates Vt+1 to Vt. Using
this function we can rewrite equation (2.4) as
Vt = h(Vt+1), 0≤ t < T. (2.5)
Notice that h(.) is a contraction4. Therefore, contraction mapping the-
orem implies that the iterative sequence {Vt} will monotonically converge to
V (τ), (which is the fixed point of h(.)), as t→−∞, i.e. as we move backwards
in time towards the beginning of the tax cut. For ease of notation, let n denote
the number of periods left until T , so that t= T −n. We can then rewrite (2.5)
as VT−n = h(VT−(n−1)). This implies that the sequence {VT−n} monotonically
4That is, h′(.) = θ(1−s) ∈ [0,1).
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converges to V (τ) as n→∞, i.e., as we move away (backwards in time) from
the end of the tax cut. Furthermore, since the sequence {VT−n} starts at V (τ¯)
and monotonically converges to V (τ), and V (τ)> V (τ¯), it must be increasing
in n. Remember that n is the number of periods until the end of tax cut. This
means value of entering the market, V , is larger in earlier periods of the tax
cuts that are further away from the end of tax cut. In other words, the value
of entering the market, and therefore the fraction of individuals who decide to
enter, is higher in periods that are further away from the end of the tax cut.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of Vt, the value of entering the market over
time. It demonstrates why a short tax cut will create limited extensive margin
response. During a short tax cut the value of entering the market is relatively
low and fewer people will do so. But as the tax cut gets longer the value of
entering the market and starting to search rises towards V (τ¯) and more people
will enter the market in earlier period. This means that the average number
of new entries per period will rise with the duration of the tax cut.
2.3.3 Search Effort
The second component that affects the dynamics of the response to the tax
cut is search effort. This section shows how agents’ search effort responds to
this temporary incentive.
Agents choose search effort st by solving the optimization problem in
equation (2.3). The F.O.C. for this problem is:
c′(st) =B(τ)− θVt+1 (2.6)
In a steady state when the tax rate is not expected to change, Vt+1 = Vt
and agents will choose the same st every period. Let s¯ and s denote the steady
state search effort when the tax is τ¯ and τ respectively.
During a temporary tax cut, given that c′(.) is an increasing function,
equation (2.6) implies that st will mirror the path of Vt described in subsec-
tion 2.3.2. That is, st will be highest in the last period before the end of tax
cut and will monotonically converge to s as t→−∞, i.e. as we move to earlier
periods of the stimulus.
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Figure 2.7 shows the evolution of search effort during a temporary tax
cut. The figure shows that search effort monotonically increases during the
cut period and reaches its highest level just before the end. However, once the
tax cut is over it falls back to its high-tax steady state level, s¯.
Intuitively, the search effort rises towards the end of the tax cut because
individuals are trying to find a match while the incentive is still in place.
This rise in search effort is the force that drives the re-timing response to the
stimulus.
2.4 Total Response And The Share of Exten-
sive Margin
Having characterized the dynamics of the extensive margin response and search
effort, we can put these together in equation (2.2) and numerically simulate the
number of transactions every period. Figure 2.8 shows the simulated number
of transactions before, during and after the temporary tax cut. As this figure
shows, the number of transactions increases sharply in the periods leading up to
the end of the tax cut and falls below its high-tax steady state level immediately
afterwards, before gradually converging to it. The former increase is driven
by the increase in search effort, as individuals try to find a match before the
tax increases at t = T . This means that a large number of individuals leave
the market just before t= T which, combined with the sudden drop in search
effort after t = T , results in a sharp drop in the number of matches just after
t= T .
In the absence of the stimulus incentive, the steady state number of trans-
actions would have been constant and equal to F (V (τ¯)), shown by the dashed
line in Figure 2.8. Let N c ≡ F (V (τ¯)) represent this counterfactual level. The
short-term effect of the stimulus is given by the number of transactions in
excess of N c between t = 0 and t = T . The permanent effect of the stimulus
is equal to the number of individuals who enter the market that would not
have done so in the absence of the tax cut, that is ∑t=Tt=0 (F (Vt)−N c). In other
words, the area under F (Vt) and above N c gives the permanent effect of the
stimulus.
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Figure 2.9 shows the number of transactions and the number of entries
into the market in excess of the counterfactual level. Remember that the area
under the former between t= 0 and t= T gives the short term response while
the area under the latter is equal to the long-term effect. This figure reveals
how the duration of the tax cut affects the share of extensive margin out of the
short-term response. In particular, it shows that the response to a short-lived
stimulus will be dominated by the sharp rise in transactions driven by increased
search effort while creating a limited extensive margin response. However, as
the duration of the stimulus increases, Vt rises (once again holding the end of
stimulus fixed and moving backwards in time) and a larger proportion of each
cohort will enter the market every period. This implies that the per period
average of the number of entries driven by extensive margin response increases.
The share of extensive margin response out of total short-term response
can more explicitly be calculated as
∑t=T
t=0 (F (Vt)−N c)∑t=T
t=0 Nt
(2.7)
Figure 2.10 shows this share for a wide range of (simulated) stimulus du-
rations, confirming that the share of extensive margin indeed increases mono-
tonically with the duration of tax cut.
2.5 Conclusion
Fiscal stimulus programs were widely used to boost activity in various markets
during the Great Recession. While it is widely believed that these programs
are effective in increasing market activity while in place, evidence on their
long-term impact has been mixed. Some studies have shown that such stim-
ulus schemes have considerable permanent effect, while others find seemingly
contradictory evidence showing that the boost in market activity created by a
stimulus program is reversed shortly after its end and the long-term effect of
the stimulus is practically zero.
In this paper, I take a first step towards reconciling these seemingly con-
tradictory results by arguing that the permanent effect of a stimulus is directly
related to its duration which could explain why studies that look at stimulus
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with considerably different durations arrive at contradicting conclusions. The
first part of the paper presented empirical evidence from the UK housing mar-
ket showing that a temporary tax cut in this market has had a considerable
long-term impact on market activity. The second part of the paper highlighted
the link between the length of the program and its long-term impact through
a search model of the housing market. The intuition captured by this model
is that a longer stimulus program gives individuals more time to search, which
means they are more likely to be able to find a match before the stimulus
ends, which increases the value of entering the market. This in turn implies
that a larger proportion of agents will decide to enter the market every period
and the share of extensive margin response will grow with the duration of the
stimulus.
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2.6 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Property transactions tax rates
Price Average tax rate
up to £125,000 0%
from £125,001 to £250,000 1%
from £250,001 to £500,000 3%
from £500,001 to £1,000,000 4%
from £1,000,001 to £2,000,000 5%
over £2,000,000 7% (bought by individuals)
15% (bought by corporations)
(a) SDLT rates until December 2014
Price Marginal tax rate
up to £125,000 0%
from £125,001 to £250,000 2%
from £250,001 to £925,000 5%
from £925,001 to £1,500,000 10%
over £1,500,000 12%
(b) SDLT rates since December 2014
Price Marginal tax rate
up to £145,000 0%
from £145,000 to £250,000 2%
from £250,000 to £325,000 5%
from £325,000 to £750,000 10%
over £750,000 12%
(c) LBTT rates since April 2015
Notes: The table shows tax rates under the three different tax schedules in effect in England
and Scotland between December 2014 and April 2015.
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Table 2.2: Difference-in-difference regression results
Dependent variable:
Log number of transactions
(1) (2)
βs 0.475∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.181)
βr −0.435∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗
(0.124) (0.164)
βp 0.058 0.049
(0.172) (0.099)
Share of extensive margin 0.542 0.605
(1.254) (1.552)
Month fixed effects No Yes
Observations 142 142
Notes: The table reports estimates from equation (2.1). βs estimates the average percentage
increase in number of transactions during the tax cut. βr estimates the average percentage fall in
number of transactions in the reversal perido after the end of the tax cut. The reversal period is
chosen to be two months. Results are robust to this choice. βp estimates the difference between
treated and control series after the end of reversal. βp being small and insignificant ensures
that the two series have converged and reversal is over. The bottom row reports the share of
extensive margin response in total short-term response as 1− 2|βr|4βs . For regression coefficients
HAC standard errors are reported. The standard error for share of extensive margin is calculated
using the delta method.
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Figure 2.1: Property transactions tax liability
Co
ntr
ol
Treated
0
£10K
£20K
£30K
£12
5K
£20
0K
£23
0K
£25
0K
£33
5K
£48
0K
£50
0K
Price
Ta
x L
iab
ility
(1) Old SDLT
(2) New SDLT
(3) LBTT
Notes: The figure shows tax liability for residential properties in the UK under three different
policy regimes. The Old SDLT was in effect in both England and Scotland until December
2014 when New SDLT was announced and immediately implemented. The LBTT took effect in
Scotland in April 2015. It was announced in October 2014. The combination of these reform
creates a four-month-long tax cut in the [£335K, £480K] price range, which is used as the
treated bracket, where tax liability is reduced unexpectedly in December (from Old SDLT to
New SDLT) and is expected to increase in April 2015 (from New SDLT to LBTT).
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Figure 2.2: Number of transactions in the treated and control price brackets.
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Notes: Effect of the temporary tax cut on the number of transactions. Black circles corresponds to the treated price range and blue triangles show the
counter-factual from the control price bracket. The two series follow each other very closely until December 2014. They also resume to have parallel
trends a few months after April 2015, once the reversal period is over.
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Figure 2.3: Number of transactions in the treated and control price brackets.
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Notes: Effect of the temporary tax cut on the number of transactions. Black circles corresponds
to the treated price range while blue triangles show the counter-factual.
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Figure 2.4: The difference in activity between the treated and the control price brackets.
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Notes: The figure shows difference in normalised number of transactions between the treated
and the control price brackets. The difference in activity is stable around zero (apart from the
run up to the Scottish independence referendum). It increases after the introduction of lower
SDLT rates in December 2014 and peaks just before higher LBTT rates were due to take effect
in April 2015. Consequently, the difference becomes negative after the end of this period for
two months before converging back to zero. This pattern closely matches the prediction of the
search model presented in section 2.3.
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative difference in market activity between treated and control price brack-
ets.
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Notes: The figure shows the lasting impact of the temporary tax cut on the level of market
activity. It shows cumulative difference in normalised number of transactions between the treated
and the control price brackets. The cumulative difference rises sharply during the tax cut period
and falls consequently. However, it converges to a higher level than before the reforms suggesting
that the amount of initial increase in activity was larger than the consecutive reversal and the
tax cut. This suggests that a considerable fraction of the response to the tax cut has been along
the extensive margin as opposed to time shifting.
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Figure 2.6: The value of entering the market over time.
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Notes: The figure shows the value of entering the market over time. This is constant before
and after the temporary tax cut as tax rate is not expected to change and we are in a steady
state. During the tax cut, the value of entering the market and starting to search first increases
and then gradually declines as we approach the end of the tax cut. This is because the later one
enters the market the less likely one is to find a match before the tax rate increases again. This
implies that longer tax cuts induce a larger increase in the value of searching and more people
will decide to enter the market every period compared to a shorter tax cut.
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Figure 2.7: Search effort over time.
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Notes: The figure shows the level of search effort, which determines the probability of finding
a match, over time. The search effort is constant in the steady states before and after the tax
cut. It increases at the beginning of the tax cut as the value of finding a match increases. As we
approach the end of the tax cut search effort rises sharply as agents try to find a match before
the end. This rise in search effort creates the re-timing response where some transactions that
would have happened after t= T are moved forward in time.
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Figure 2.8: Simulated number of transactions over time.
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Notes: The figure shows the simulated number of matches in the market using Equation (2.2).
N c marks the high-tax steady state level of activity. The number of matches increases imme-
diately at t = 0 when the tax rate goes down. Towards the end of tax cut, number of matches
increases as agents increase their search effort to find a match before the tax rate goes up at
t= T . This implies that an increasing number of agents leave the market just before t= T . This
in turn results in a sharp drop in market activity just after t= T .
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Figure 2.9: Number of matches and the number of entries to the market, in excess of high-tax
steady state.
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Notes: The figure shows the simulated number of matches in the market using Equation (2.2)
(black solid line) along with number of entries to the market (dashed blue line). The level of
activity in the high-tax steady state has been normalised to zero and so the graph shows activity
in excess of the high-tax steady state. The area under the black curve measures the short-term
response to the tax cut, i.e. the increase in the number of transactions during the tax cut. The
area under the new entries curve measures the extensive margin response, i.e. the number of
people that enter the market who would not have done so in the absence of the tax cut. The
figure illustrates that the response to a short tax cut will be dominated by a large increase in
short-term activity while failing to create a large extensive margin response.
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Figure 2.10: Share of extensive margin response in the total short-term response.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 25 50 75Duration	of	tax	cut	(Simulation	periods)
Share	o
f	extens
ive	mar
gin
Notes: The figure shows the share of extensive margin response out of total short-term response
as a function of the duration of the stimulus. The share is calculated using equation (2.7) and
simulated tax cuts with various durations. As the duration of the tax cut increases, the value of
entering the market in earlier periods increases and more people enter the market every period.
This increases the (per period) average of the extensive margin response, which the permanent
component of the effect of the tax cut.
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Chapter 3
Frequent Repayments as a Screening
Device in Micro-lending Under
Individual Liability
3.1 Introduction
Microfinance has been of intense academic interest to development economists
for the past two decades. Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have
been carried out and a vast literature has been produced on the topic. A con-
siderable part of the theoretical literature has been concerned with proposing
new methods to improve on existing practices, as well as offering explanations
for the unexpected success of microfinance industry in sustainable banking
with the poor.
One of the potential difficulties in lending to the poor is the problem
of adverse selection. In a credit market with two types of borrowers, risky
and safe, where the bank is unable to distinguish between the two types, it
has to offer the same interest rate to all borrowers. Then the presence of
risky borrowers might drive safe borrowers out of the market, through pushing
the break-even interest rate of the bank above their participation threshold
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In the context of micro-lending, the main focus of
the literature has been on the role of joint liability in tackling the problem of
adverse selection. Ghatak (2000) and Van Tassel (1999) for example, address
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the problem of adverse selection in the context of microfinance and show how
joint liability can be used as a screening device.
But joint liability is not the only form of contract that MFIs use. In
fact, a large number of MFIs have abandoned explicit joint liability during the
past decade and opted for individual liability loans. In the absence of explicit
joint liability, lenders use other techniques, such as non-refinancing threats,
sequential lending and frequent repayments, to maintain high repayment rates.
The latter especially, is widely believed, at least by practitioners, to be crucial
to inducing financial discipline and high repayment rates. This paper seeks to
explain the role of frequent repayment in screening different types of borrowers.
Empirical evidence on the effect of repayment frequency is mixed. While
some MFIs, such as BRAC, have experienced increases in delinquency rates
when trying to reduce the frequency of repayments, there are other studies
that find contrasting results. McIntosh (2008) uses variations in the contract
terms offered by FINCA Uganda in different parts of the country to investigate
the effect of repayment frequency and finds that when groups were allowed
to switch to biweekly repayment, both dropout and default rates fell. This
experiment investigates the effect of letting existing customers choose from a
menu of contracts. Field and Pande (2008) on the other hand, carry out an
experiment on groups of first time borrowers and find no significant effect of
tighter repayment schedule on default and delinquency rates.
The theoretical literature however, had largely overlooked the role of fre-
quent repayments until recently. Jain and Mansuri (2003) argue that a tight
repayment schedule forces clients to borrow from local informal lenders in or-
der to cope with their repayment obligation. This enables the MFI to use
the monitoring abilities of informal lenders. Fischer and Ghatak (2010) focus
on borrower behavior and argue that frequent repayments could increase the
maximum incentive compatible loan size for present biased agents.
This essay also focuses on the behavior of borrowers. However, it assumes
that agents are rational in its classic sense, and tries to highlight the role
of frequent repayments in screening out risky clients. The basic idea is that
a “risky” borrower has a more volatile stream of earnings which makes her
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incapable of fitting into a tight repayment schedule. The lender could use this
to design a menu of contracts that would separate risky clients from safe ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 demonstrates the
problem of underinvestment in credit markets with adverse selection using a
simple model. Section 3.3 expands this baseline model and introduces gradual
repayments. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 One-Shot Repayment
In this section I briefly present a one-period model of adverse selection in
credit markets, in which borrowers repay their loan in one single installment,
and which closely follows the individual liability lending model by Ghatak
(2000). I will then extend the model by introducing the possibility of gradual
repayment of the loans, in order to demonstrate the use of frequent repayment
as a screening device.
3.2.1 The Environment
The economy consists of a lender and a large population of borrowers, the size
of which is normalized to one. All agents have access to a risky investment
project which needs one unit of capital. Their wealth is assumed to be zero and
they have to borrow to finance their projects. Agents have different intrinsic
probabilities of success in their investment projects. In particular, there are
two types of agents in this economy: a portion, θ, of borrowers are “risky”,
whose projects succeed with probability pr, and the remaining 1−θ, are “safe”
borrowers who succeed with probability ps, with 0< pr < ps < 1. The project
yields 0 if it fails and Ri > 0, i = r,s, for a borrower of type i, if it succeeds.
Borrowers are risk neutral and maximize expected returns. The reservation
utilities of both types of borrowers are normalized to zero for simplicity.
The lending side consists of a single risk neutral bank whose opportunity
cost of capital is ρ per loan.
The type of a borrower is her private information and the bank cannot
observe it. But the outcomes of the borrowers’ projects are observable for the
bank. Borrowers have to repay the full cost of the loan when their projects
are successful. However, because of the limited liability assumption, which
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will be maintained throughout, in the case of failure borrowers are only liable
up to the amount of assets they own, which we have assumed to be zero.
Enforcement costs are assumed to be negligible for the moment. But we will
relax this assumption later.
3.2.2 The One-Period Model
If the bank can observe the types of the borrowers, it can charge borrowers
of each type a different interest rate such that it breaks even. In particular,
I assume that the bank maximizes the utility of borrowers, subject to a zero
profit constraint and the limited liability assumption. Solving the zero profit
constraint of the bank, we get:
r∗i =
ρ
pi
, i= r,s (3.1)
3.2.2.1 The Problem of Underinvestment
Assume that the expected return to all projects are the same, prRr = psRs = R¯
and R¯ > ρ, so that all projects are socially productive. If the bank cannot
distinguish between risky and safe borrowers, offering different contracts is
not possible, as risky borrowers would have an incentive to pretend to be safe
and pay the lower interest rate ρ/ps . So the bank has to offer a single interest
rate to both types of borrowers through which it can break even.
If the bank charges everyone the same interest rate, safe borrowers will
have a lower expected payoff, as they are more likely to succeed and have to
repay more often. But the expected return of a safe borrower is the same as
that of a risky borrower. Now solving the zero profit constraint of the bank, we
get r = ρ/p¯ , where p¯≡ θpr +(1−θ)ps. Denote by Ui(r) the utility of a type i
borrower as a function of the interest rate. Since Us(r)<Ur(r), for r = ρ/p¯ to
be the optimal pooling equilibrium, we need to make sure that safe borrowers
will participate under this interest rate, i.e., ρ/p¯≤ R¯/ps
However, if the above inequality fails to hold, a pooling contract that
would attract both types of borrowers does not exist. The optimal contract
then, would be the one that only attracts risky borrowers, charges an interest
of ρ/pr and satisfies the zero-profit condition for lending to risky borrowers
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only. In this case, safe borrowers will be forced out of the market by the
high interest rate and only risky borrowers will borrow. Although the projects
of safe borrowers are socially productive, they will not invest and both the
repayment rate and welfare are strictly lower than the full-information case.
This is known as the under-investment problem in credit markets with adverse
selection (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
3.3 Frequent Repayment as a Screening De-
vice
This section develops a model of gradual repayments and shows how it can
be used to design a menu of separating contracts for two types of borrowers.
The basic idea here is as follows. Since a risky borrower succeeds less often,
but earns bigger sums when she is successful, the variance of her earnings is
bigger than that of a safe borrower. A tight repayment schedule, i.e., higher
repayment frequency, requires the borrowers to have a steady stream of returns,
as they are required to repay more often. The lender can use this feature to
make the borrowers self-select into two different contracts. Those who have a
more volatile flow of income cannot fit into a tight repayment schedule, and
would rather pay a higher interest rate in return for having a more flexible
repayment schedule, i.e., repaying less often.
Since we are going to make a model of gradual repayment, we need to
introduce a process for the earnings of the borrowers which would specify how
they earn money over the course of the loan.
3.3.1 Returns of Investment Projects
As the first departure from the baseline model, we need to decide how the
returns of the projects are realized over time. I assume that the (accumulated)
returns of an investment project constitute a Poisson process. In particular,
borrowers of type i earn money at random points in time, and at a constant
rate of λi, i = r, s, with λr < λs. The probability of k successes per unit of
time is given by the Poisson probability distribution function:
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f(k;λ) = λ
ke−λ
k! (3.2)
Each time a type i borrower is successful she earns a fixed amount, Ri. So,
the expected return from the projects are λiRi1. This is assumed to be the same
for both types of borrowers as in the one period model, i.e., λrRr = λsRs = R¯.
Since λr < λs, we have Rr >Rs.
One way to interpret this is to assume that each borrower of type i has a
shop and customers arrive at her shop and buy products at a rate λi. Risky
borrowers earn higher profits per sale, but manage to sell their products less
often. Safe borrowers on the other hand earn lower profits per sale, but sell
more often. Although the expected returns of both borrowers are equal to R¯,
the variance of the profits of the safe borrower is smaller.
3.3.1.1 Equivalence to the one-shot repayment model
The model with a Poisson earnings process can be shown to be equivalent
to the one-shot repayment model of section 3.2 provided that the following
assumption holds; we need to assume that the profits earned from one success,
which is equal to Ri for a borrower of type i, is sufficient to repay the loan,
that is:
Assumption 3.1 Ri ≥ ri.
In this case the probability that a borrower of type i will be able to repay
the loan is equal to the probability that she is successful at least once. Using
the distribution function of the Poisson distribution, this implies:
pi = 1− e−λi (3.3)
where, as in the one-shot repayment model, pi is the probability that a
type i borrower will be able to repay her loan.
1The time period over which the returns of projects are realized is normalized to 1 and
the mean of the Poisson distribution is equal to the rate of arrivals, in this case, λ.
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3.3.2 Preferences over Contracts and the Single-
Crossing Property
3.3.2.1 Gradual Repayment and the Timing of Installments
Contracts consist of a pair (n,r), where r is the interest rate and n is the
number of installments. I assume that the loan is disbursed at t = 0, the
project starts immediately and the repayment ends at t = 1. So, a borrower
who has accepted a contract (n,r) has to repay n installments at t= k/n, for
k = 1, ...,n, each of size r/n. I assume that borrowers do not discount future
payoffs.
Moreover, I assume that only the profits realized between t = (k− 1)/n
and t= k/n can be used to pay the k-th installment. In other words, borrowers
cannot save between periods. So, a borrower can repay her k-th installment
only if she has been successful at least once between t= (k−1)/n and t= k/n.
Assumption 3.2 Borrowers do not save between periods.
3.3.2.2 Repayment Incentive Constraint: Avoiding Strategic De-
fault
In this section I relax the assumption that enforcement costs are negligible
and assume that the lender is not able to enforce contracts. This means that
the lender has to design the contracts such that the borrower would prefer
repayment over strategic default.
I assume that every time a borrower defaults, i.e., is unable or unwilling
to repay an installment, she incurs a constant disutility or cost of default, c.
An alternative would be to assume that the cost of default is proportional to
the size of the missed payment. While this could be a more realistic assump-
tion, assuming a fixed cost makes the model more tractable and could be a
reasonable proxy for the cost of default. One plausible interpretation for this
would be the increase in the probability of losing the next loan. For example,
in the Grameen II system of the Grameen Bank, when a borrower defaults
on her loan, “her loan ceiling that she has built over years, gets wiped out”
(Yunus 2002). For the sake of tractability, I will also assume that borrowers
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cannot pay previously missed instalments.
Therefore, I focus my attention on the set of contracts that provide the
borrower with enough incentive to avoid strategic default, namely, contracts
for which r/n < c. If this does not hold, borrowers would prefer to default on
every installment, even when they are able to repay.
3.3.2.3 Preferences Over Contracts
Provided that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold, the expected utility of a borrower
of type i from accepting a contract (n,r) is:
Ui(n,r) = R¯− r
n
(1− e−λi/n)n−nce−λi/n (3.4)
Remember that 1−e−λi/n is the probability that a borrower can afford to
repay an installment. So, the second term is the expected number of install-
ments that the borrower is going to pay, times the size of each installment,
r/n. The third term is the expected number of defaults times the cost of each
default. This can be rewritten as:
Ui(n,r) = (R¯− r) + (r−nc)e−λi/n (3.5)
For simplicity I will treat n as a continuous variable henceforth. This will
simplify the model without changing the qualitative implications.
Lemma 3.1 The preferences of borrowers over contracts satisfy the single-
crossing property.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
The single-crossing property is a standard feature required for incentive
compatibility in screening different types of agents in adverse selection models.
Formally, the single-crossing property means that the slope of the indif-
ference curve of a borrower is an increasing function of her type, λ in this case
(see Figure 3.1), which means that the marginal rate of substitution between
r and n is different for the two types of borrowers. In particular, a rise in the
interest rate has a smaller effect on the expected utility of a risky borrower, as
she repays less often. In contrast, she cares about the number of installments
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more than a safe borrower does, because the risky borrower is more likely to
default and incur the cost, c. So, the risky borrower is willing to accept a
bigger rise in the interest rate, in return for a smaller decrease in the number
of installments, compared to the safe borrower. This makes the indifference
curve of the risky borrower steeper than that of the safe borrower.
3.3.3 Optimal Contracting with Gradual Repayment
This section characterizes a menu of optimal contracts. This is done by solving
for optimal separating contracts in a contracting problem with the following
timing:
1. The lender offers the borrower a menu of contracts, {(n∗r, r∗r),(n∗s, r∗s)}.
2. The borrower decides whether to participate and chooses a contract.
3. Loans are disbursed and the borrower starts her investment project.
4. For each k= 1, ...,n, the borrower decides whether to repay an installment
of size r/n, at t= k/n, if she can afford it.
The optimal contracting problem is as follows: the lender maximizes a
weighted average of welfares of the two types of borrowers by choosing two
contracts (n∗r, r∗r) and (n∗s, r∗s):
W = γUr(nr, rr) + (1−γ)Us(ns, rs) (3.6)
where γ ∈ (0,1).
The optimization is subject to the following constraints:
a) The zero-profit constraint of the lender: The expected profit of the lender
from each contract has to be non-negative. The expected number of
installments that a borrower of type i can afford to repay is n(1−e−λi/n).
The size of each installment is r/n. The zero-profit condition requires
the lender to charge the following interest rate:
ri =
ρ
1− e−λi/n (3.7)
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Since the lender is maximizing the welfare of the borrower, the zero-profit
condition binds at the optimum. Let ZPCi denote the set of contracts
that satisfy this constraint with equality.
b) The Participation Constraint of the borrower (PC): The expected payoff
of the borrower from accepting the contract has to be as much as her
reservation utility, which is normalized to zero. This implies:
Ui(n,r) = (R¯− r) + e−λi/n(r−nc)≥ 0 (3.8)
c) The limited liability constraint: A borrower cannot repay more than
the amount of assets she owns, which is assumed to be zero here. This
constraint along with assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, imply that a borrower
will repay the k-th installment only if she has had at least one success
during the last period, that is, between t= (k−1)/n and t= k/n.
d) The incentive compatibility constraint: The contracts have to be such
that a borrower of type i would prefer the contract meant for her type
to the other option. More formally:
Ur(nr, rr)≥ Ur(ns, rs) (3.9)
Us(ns, rs)≥ Us(nr, rr) (3.10)
e) The repayment incentive constraint (RIC): Since contracts are not en-
forceable, the interest rate and the frequency of installments have to
be such that the borrower prefers repayment over strategic default. As
discussed earlier, this requires r/n≤ c.
Before proceeding to the solution of the optimal contracting problem we
need to make sure that the set of contracts that satisfy these constraints
(except for incentive compatibility), is not empty. Specifically, I assume
that single repayment lending to risky borrowers is feasible, i.e., the contract
(1,ρ/(1− e−λr)) which has the zero-profit interest rate and only one install-
ment satisfies the participation and repayment incentive constraints.
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More formally, for this contract to satisfy the repayment incentive con-
straint we need:
Assumption 3.3 r1r ≡ ρ1−e−λr ≤ c
Also, for this contract to satisfy the participation constraint we need to
assume that:
Assumption 3.4 R¯− r1r + e−λr(r1r − c)≥ 0
or in terms of the baseline model, with pr = 1− e−λr for n = 1, this can
be rewritten as:
R¯− r1rpr ≥ c(1−pr) (3.11)
The left hand side is the expected profit of the investment project and the
right hand side is the expected cost of default. Assumption 3.4 says that the
expected net gain of investment is such that the borrower chooses to partici-
pate.
As Figure 3.2 shows, if the participation constraint of the risky borrower
holds, so will the PC of the safe borrower. Contracts below the RIC line
satisfy the repayment incentive constraint. Therefore, we are interested in
contracts that lie on ZPCi, i= r,s, and are below RIC and PCr.
Proposition 3.1 Under assumptions 3.1 - 3.4, optimal separating contracts
(n∗r, r∗r) and (n∗s, r∗s) exist. Furthermore, r∗s < r∗r and n∗s > n∗r. The welfare of
the risky borrower is the same as in the full-information case while the welfare
of the safe borrower is strictly lower.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 3.3 depicts the menu of optimal contracts. A formal proof of the
proposition is provided in the appendix. Intuitively, the pair of contracts can be
constructed as follows. First, pick the contract (n∗r, r∗r) which gives the highest
feasible utility to risky borrowers, represented by u1r. Next, pick a contract,
(n∗s, r∗s), for the safe borrower that would satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint (along with other constraints). For incentive compatibility, this
contract needs to be on or above u1r so that ur(n∗s, r∗s)< ur(n∗r, r∗r), and below
u1s, so that us(n∗s, r∗s) > us(n∗r, r∗r). Given that the objective is to maximize a
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linear combination of utilities, the optimal contract for the safe type is the one
that provides the highest feasible utility, us1.
Proposition 3.1 shows that risky borrowers will choose a contract with
a more flexible repayment schedule, i.e. lower frequency of repayment, but a
higher interest rate. Safe borrowers however are able to fit in a tight repayment
schedule, namely, repaying more frequently, and will choose a contract with a
lower interest rate, but higher frequency of repayment. This is in fact a signal
that a safe borrower can send to the lender to credibly reveal her type, and
one that a risky borrower cannot afford.
3.4 Conclusion
This essay looks at an economic environment in which inefficiencies are present
due to asymmetric information. It was shown using a simple model of adverse
selection that under individual liability contracts, a tight repayment schedule
can be used to screen different types of borrowers. This is done by offering the
clients a menu of contracts which is designed such that borrowers of different
types would self-select into different contracts.
This is in line with the almost universal belief among microfinance prac-
titioners that a frequent repayment schedule is crucial to maintaining high
repayment rates and avoiding default. This model should be seen as a first
attempt to suggest an explanation for the effect of frequent repayment.
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3.5 Figures
Figure 3.1: Indifference curves of risky and safe borrowers
An indifference curve
of a safe borrower
An indifference curve
of a risky borrower
Numer of installments (n)
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)
Notes: The figure shows an indifference curve of a risky and a safe borrower. The
marginal rate of substitution between n and r is an increasing function of the type
of agents, λ. Therefore, the indifference curves satisfy the single-crossing property.
Note that utility increases towards the origin.
90
Figure 3.2: The constraints of the contracting problem
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Notes: The figure shows the constraints of the lender’s optimization problem. Con-
tracts below RIC, PCs and PCr curves satisfy the corresponding constraints. Con-
tracts that lie on ZPCs and ZPCr satisfy the zero profit constraint for safe and
risky borrowers, respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Optimal separating contracts
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Notes: The figure shows the optimal separating contracts (n∗s, r∗s) and (n∗r , r∗r).
These contracts are belowRIC, PCs and PCr and therefore satisfy these constraints.
They also lie on their corresponding ZPC curve which means they satisfy the zero-
profit condition. They also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint as the risky
type is indifferent between the two contracts, while the safe borrowers strictly prefers
(n∗s, r∗s).
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. A sufficient condition for the preferences to satisfy the
single-crossing property is1:
∂
∂λi
(−∂Ui/∂n
∂Ui/∂r
)> 0. (A.1)
That is, the slopes of the indifference curves of agents are required to be
a monotone function of their types.
The slope of the indifference curve of a type i borrower is equal to:
dr
dn
=−∂Ui/∂n
∂Ui/∂r
= e
−λ/n
1− e−λ/n
{
λ
n2
(r−nc)− c
}
(A.2)
Differentiating this with respect to λ and simplifying yields:
∂
∂λi
(−∂Ui/∂n
∂Ui/∂r
) = e
−λ/n
n2
(
1− e−λ/n
)2
(
r− λ
n
(r−nc)
)
(A.3)
which is positive, given that we are dealing with contracts that satisfy repay-
ment incentive constraint, i.e. r < nc.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Take (1,ρ/(1−e−λr)) as the contract for risky borrowers and let us denote
this contract by (n∗r, r∗r). Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 guarantee that (n∗r, r∗r)
satisfies all of the constraints of the contracting problem.
Figure 3.3 shows the constraints of the problem and indifference curves of
1See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 7, p. 259 for a formal definition.
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borrowers. Let us denote by u1r the indifference curve of a risky borrower that
passes through this contract. Let us also denote by u0r the indifference curve of
a risky borrower that represents utility level zero, which coincides with PCr.
Since u1r represents a level of utility higher than zero, and utility increases
as one moves towards the origin, the u1r curve will always be below u0r. In
particular, consider n0, the value of n for which u0r (PCr) intersects ZPCs. u1r
will be below u0r and therefore below ZPCs for this n. Therefore, u1r < ZPCs
at n= n0.
We know that ZPCs is always below ZPCr. In particular, at n= 1, where
u1r (by construction) intersects ZPCr, it will be above ZPCs. So, u1r > ZPCs
at n= 1.
It follows from the continuity of u1r and ZPCs that they must intersect
for some n between n= 1 and n= n0. Let us denote the contract at this point
of intersection by (n∗s, r∗s).
Notice that n∗s > 1 = n∗r. Equation (A.2) shows that drdn < 0 for all points
below RIC. So, n∗s > n∗r implies that r∗s < r∗r .
It is obvious that (n∗s, r∗s) satisfies zero-profit and repayment incentive
constraints. It is below u0r and therefore satisfies the participation of the risky
borrower. Since the participation constraint of the risky borrower is more
restrictive, this implies that (n∗s, r∗s) also satisfies the participation constraint
of the safe borrower.
With regards to the incentive compatibility constraint, notice that both
contracts lie on u1r which means that a risky borrower would be indifferent
between them. Moreover, because of the single-crossing property of indifference
curves, u1s the indifference curve of a safe borrower that passes through (n∗r, r∗r)
stays above u1r for all interest rates less than r∗r , including r∗s . This implies that
(n∗s, r∗s) is below u1s and is strictly preferred to (n∗r, r∗r) by the safe borrower.
Therefore, these two contracts satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint as
well.
The contract (1,ρ/(1− e−λr)) obviously maximizes the welfare of risky
borrowers subject to the constraint of the problem. (n∗s, r∗s) is also the utility
maximizing contract for safe borrowers, because if it is moved towards the ori-
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gin to increase the utility of safe borrowers, the new contract will be preferred
to (n∗r, r∗r) by risky borrowers, hence violating the incentive compatibility con-
straint.
This proves that (n∗r, r∗r) and (n∗s, r∗s) constitute a menu of optimal sepa-
rating contracts with n∗s > n∗r and r∗s < r∗r .
99
